The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

July 2015

John A. Bingham and the Story of American
Liberty: The Lost Cause Meets the "Lost Clause"
Michael Kent Curtis

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Construction Law Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment Commons
Recommended Citation
Curtis, Michael Kent (2003) "John A. Bingham and the Story of American Liberty: The Lost Cause Meets the
"Lost Clause"," Akron Law Review: Vol. 36 : Iss. 4 , Article 2.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Curtis: The Story of American Liberty
NEWCURTIS.DOC

7/28/03 11:48 AM

JOHN A. BINGHAM AND THE STORY OF AMERICAN
LIBERTY: THE LOST CAUSE MEETS THE “LOST
CLAUSE”
Michael Kent Curtis*

I. INTRODUCTION: OUR STORY
We tell and retell stories. Individuals have stories and so do
families. The stories tell us who we are and how we fit in the widening
concentric circles of the individual, the family, the community, the
nation and the world.1
Nations have stories too. Ours is a story about the American
Revolution against monarchy and aristocracy, a revolution based on the
faith that all people are created equal and endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable rights. The revolution espoused the ideal that
legitimate governmental power comes only from the consent of the
governed.
In the old world, kings were sovereign. In America, the sovereign
was “the people.” That ideal appeared in the preamble of the
Constitution—a preamble that declared (somewhat inaccurately) that the
Constitution came from “we the people” and was designed to assure
liberty and justice. Though we often fall short of them, ideals matter.
The Bill of Rights to the Constitution, added in 1791, also stated ideals;
*
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1. JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING (1990); SAM KEEN, TO A DANCING GOD 83-105
(1970).
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it declared and protected basic liberties of the people. With the end of
the Civil War, slavery was abolished. In 1919 women got the vote. At
any rate, according to our story, the United States is a democracy that
protects basic rights of its citizens.
As far as I can recall, that was pretty much the American story I
learned in public schools in Galveston, Texas, in the 1950s. Of course,
the dominant Texas story had some peculiarities that did not fit too well
with the larger story. According to the version I recall, greedy Yankees
and ignorant blacks subjected the South to a period of misrule after the
Civil War—from which, somehow or other, the South was rescued. If
my high school history book told me just how the rescue was effected, I
do not recall.
The Texas story was supplemented by others I heard. The Civil
War, my grandmother assured me, was not about slavery. It was about
states’ rights.
But there was a troubling dissonance between the old story and the
world of the 1950s and 1960s. Blacks were seeking integrated
education, the right to vote, and the right to equal treatment in
employment and in places of public accommodation. By the eighth
grade, I was a strong supporter of the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education. But, of course, critics of the decision said it violated states’
rights.
Around this time, my older cousin Walter (a Yankee from New
York) came to visit. I remember my grandmother telling him, “You
know Walter, the South won the first and last battles of the Civil War.”
Walter replied, “Yes grandmother, but the North won the war.”
My grandmother had left out a crucial Southern victory. Though I
did not know it at the time, Civil War and Reconstruction history had
long been a battleground. The Southern elite lost the Civil War, but for
many years it won the battle for American history.
The post Civil War battle over history was not simply about the
past—it never is. If the Southern slaveholding elite had led the South
into a ruinous war to defend their financial stake in a discredited
institution, recognition of that fact would have helped to fuel first the
Southern Republican and then the Populist revolt against the old order.
For the ante-bellum Southern elite, the decision to rewrite history made
practical sense. The Commissar in George Orwell’s book 1984 put the
issue succinctly: “Who controls the past controls the present. Who
controls the present, controls the future.”
Supporters of the old Southern elite launched a massive propaganda
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campaign.2 They purged schools and public libraries of offending
books, and they monitored teachers too. They attempted to purify
colleges and universities. They gave public speeches and organized
youth groups where children were taught catechisms about states rights
and happy slaves.3 The revisers had substantial success in the South and
to a remarkable degree in the North as well.
The Southern revisionist history of the Civil War—that it was about
states’ rights, not slavery—was grossly distorted. In the years before the
Civil War, congressmen argued again and again about slavery. States’
rights had merely a supporting role, appearing on the stage when useful,
disappearing when inconvenient. When states’ rights suited the needs of
slaveholders, they argued states’ rights. When states’ rights interfered
with the slaveholder agenda, appeals to states’ rights were abandoned.4
So states’ rights disappeared from the stage when Northern state laws
provided due process protections for blacks living in the North who were
claimed as fugitive slaves. Similarly, Southern politicians ignored
Northern states’ free speech rights in their demands that Northern states
suppress abolitionists and extradite abolitionist editors for trial in the
South or change their state laws and constitutions to suppress
abolitionist “agitation.” On these occasions, Northerners were more
likely to invoke states’ rights.
The most telling evidence that slavery–not states’ rights–was the
cause of the Civil War comes from speeches by Southern leaders
advocating or justifying secession. Jefferson Davis, who became the
Confederate President, said excluding slavery from the territories would
make “property in slaves so insecure as to be comparatively worthless”
and in effect would “annihilate property worth thousands of millions of
dollars.”5 In March 1861, Alexander Stephens, Vice President of the
Confederacy, said the nation had been founded on the false idea that all
men were created equal. The Confederacy, he said, was “founded upon
exactly the opposite idea.” The foundation of the Confederacy was the
“great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery. . .

2. Fred Arthur Bailey, Free Speech and the Lost Cause in the Old Dominion, 103 VA. MAG.
AND BIOGRAPHY 237-924 (April 1995).
3. Id. at 244-58.
4. For a discussion of the use of states’ rights by both Northern and Southern states (when
convenient), see Paul Finkelman, States Rights, North and South in AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION
(Kermit Hall and J. Ely eds., 1989).
5. 5 JEFFERSON DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONALIST: HIS LETTERS, PAPERS AND SPEECHES 72
(Dunbar Roland ed., Miss. Dept. of Archives and History, 1923). James McPherson, Southern
Comfort, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, April 12, 2001 at 28.
OF HIST.
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is his natural and moral condition.”6 The commissioners sent from the
first seceding states to encourage other Southern states to join them
justified secession based on the threat to slave property.7 Of seventeen
reasons Mississippi gave for leaving the Union in its January 9, 1861,
“Declaration of Causes of Secession,” at least sixteen related to slavery.8
The final one warned of the loss of property worth “four billions of
money.” After the Civil War, Jefferson Davis, Alexander Stephens and
others sang a different tune: the war was about states’ rights, not slavery.
Of course, the stories we tell are important. Often, however, the
most significant stories are the ones we repress, ignore, or forget–the
elephant in the living room no one talks about. For many years, the
nation ignored how slavery and the Southern racial caste system had
undermined the nation’s ideals of equality, liberty, and democracy. We
have celebrated the Framers of the original Constitution and of the Bill
of Rights. But for years our national story largely ignored our second
group of framers who gave the nation the new birth of freedom in the
post Civil War amendments. Most of us have never heard of the old
time Republicans who framed the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments, people like John A. Bingham of Ohio, Jacob Howard of
Michigan, and James Wilson of Iowa. They struggled to put liberty and
equality on a more secure constitutional foundation. But for many years,
they and their efforts were generally ignored, and when not ignored they
were often attacked.
To the extent that it told the story of Reconstruction at all, the
dominant view until the 1950s tended to be critical of the Republicans in
Congress from 1866-1873 and critical of the Republican Southern state
governments established during Reconstruction.9 These views were
expressed, for example, in studies coming out of Columbia University in
New York City. In 1914, Professor J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton
contended that Reconstruction in North Carolina was an episode when
“selfish politicians, backed by the federal government, for party
purposes attempted to Africanize the State and deprive the people
through misrule and oppression of most that life held dear.”10
6. Speech of Alexander Stephens, AUGUSTA DAILY CONSTITUTIONALIST, Mar. 30, 1861,
cited in McPherson, supra note 5 .
7. CHARLES B. DEW, APOSTLES OF DISUNION: SOUTHERN SECESSION COMMISSIONERS AND
THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR (2001).
8. Mississippi Declaration of Causes of Secession, Jan. 9, 1861.
9. See, e.g., RICHARD N. CURRENT, ARGUING WITH HISTORIANS 78-79 (1987); DAVID W.
BRIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY 395 (2001).
10. J. G. DE ROULHAC HAMILTON, RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTH CAROLINA (Vol. LVIII of
Studies in History, Economics and Public Law edited by the faculty of Political Science of
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In Louisiana, as elsewhere in the South, the end of Reconstruction
and the triumph of the “Redeemers” was facilitated by violence and
intimidation aimed at blacks and Republicans. In his 1939 biography,
Mr. Justice Miller and the Supreme Court (1862-1890), published by the
Harvard University Press, Charles Fairman referred to the Republican
government supported by blacks and whites as the “carpetbag
government.” According to Fairman, when that government was
removed, “self government was restored in Louisiana.”11
Of course, some told a very different story about Reconstruction.12
By the 1960s, during the Second Reconstruction, historians generally
began to look again at the First, and to reconsider the conventional
wisdom.13
Still, the Southern story had a pervasive effect and reconsideration
of it was slow to penetrate the world of legal scholars or the marble
palace of the law.14 For many years, Charles Fairman’s discussion of
whether the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to require states to
obey the Bill of Rights was treated by most scholars as historically, if
not legally, definitive.15 Fairman was quite critical of John Bingham—
the principle author of Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment and of
other Republicans in the Thirty-ninth Congress.16 The major scholarly
criticism of Fairman’s article17 was ignored. Fairman devoted no
significant attention to the more than thirty years of attempts to suppress
anti-slavery speech that preceded the framing of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Columbia University) (1964 reprint of 1914 edition).
11. CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT (1862-1890) 180
(1939).
12. See, e.g., W. E. B. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION (1935); VERNON L. WHARTON,
THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI (1947, 1965). For an overview of historians treatment of constitutional
issues connected with the Civil War and Reconstruction, see Michael Les Benedict, A
Constitutional Crisis in WRITING THE CIVIL WAR: THE QUEST TO UNDERSTAND 154-73 (James M.
McPherson and William J. Cooper, Jr. eds. 1998).
13. E.g., KENNETH STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 (1965). The most
comprehensive recent study is ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1998).
14. For a thoughtful discussion, see PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING
RECONSTRUCTION 11-13, 115-116 (1999).
15. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 2-3 (1986) [hereinafter CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE]. See also,
e.g., NOEL T. DOWLING & GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
730 (1965) (omitting Crosskey’s response to Fairman).
16. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2 STAN.
L. REV. 5 (1949).
17. William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, “Legislative History,” and the
Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954).
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In 1964, the Supreme Court wrote its great decision in New York
Times v. Sullivan,18 protecting the right to criticize Southern
segregationist officials. But when the Court looked for a paradigmatic
historical event to support its decision, it cited only to the repudiation of
the Sedition Act.19 It did not cite the suppression of anti-slavery and
Republican speech in the South before the Civil War or the connection
between these events and Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment.20
Of course, the libel suit against the New York Times was based on state
law, not federal law. The Fourteenth Amendment was the precise source
of the free press protection at issue in the New York Times case. The
advertisement supporting Martin Luther King that produced the suit was
part of the continuing struggle against the legacy of slavery. Why did
the Court fail to cite such pertinent history? There may be several
reasons, but certainly one is crucial. The battle for free speech and other
civil liberties for opponents of slavery and Republicans had been largely
forgotten. Of course, the effect of that struggle on shaping the
Fourteenth Amendment was also forgotten.
The majority opinion in the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases ignored
the struggle for civil liberty for opponents of slavery. Instead, the Court
pictured the Fourteenth Amendment as merely a response to Black
Codes passed by the Southern states after the Civil War. As the Court
reported them, those acts simply denied blacks the right to contract, to
own property, etc.21 The Slaughter-House Court gave examples of the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected against the states. Typically, these
had little to do with the struggle to protect civil liberties for critics of
slavery or with the problems facing black and white Republicans during
Reconstruction. According to the Court, the clause meant that citizens
had the right to go to and return from the seat of government, to visit the
sub-treasuries, and to be protected on the high seas and in foreign lands.
The Court also mentioned the rights to assemble and petition, rights it
soon limited to assembling to petition the national government.22 The
18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19. Id. at 273. See also Brief of the New York Times, 58 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 41-51 (original) 444-54 (Philip B
Kurland; Gerhard Casper, eds. 1975). See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION 243, 307 (1998); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S
DARLING PRIVILEGE:” STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 299, 412
(2000) [hereinafter, CURTIS, FREE SPEECH].
20. See CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at chapters 5-13 and 16.
21. Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70 (1872).
22. 83 U.S. at 78-80. Recently some scholars have suggested that the majority opinion in
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Court’s story of the Fourteenth Amendment—a story that leaves out the
struggle for civil liberty in the years before the Civil War—was
reiterated by prominent legal scholars.23
The lingering effects of our national amnesia and of the Southern
elite’s story of Reconstruction can be seen in 1977. In that year, the
Harvard University Press published Raoul Berger’s book Government by
Judiciary, which received wide public attention.
The Supreme Court in the period from 1872-1900 had interpreted
the Constitution so as to undermine the first Reconstruction. The Warren
Court, however, interpreted the Constitution to support the Second
Reconstruction. Raoul Berger was harshly critical of many of its
decisions, including those of the Warren Court and its predecessors
applying guarantees in the Bill of Rights to the states, “the incorporation
doctrine.” The name seems to come from the idea that liberties referred
to in the Bill of Rights are incorporated by reference by general
descriptions of constitutional rights in Section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Whether the rights in the Bill of Rights were merely limits on the
federal government (as the old Court had typically held from 18761924), or were rights of American citizens that the states must also obey,
was an issue in both Reconstructions. Unlike the old Court, beginning
in the 1930s and reaching a high point during the Warren Court, the
Court held most guarantees of the Bill of Rights were incorporated in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Without application of free speech, press,
petition, and assembly guarantees to the states, the Southern states could
have done more to suppress the Civil Rights Movement’s dissent against
their racial caste system.
Raoul Berger attacked these incorporation decisions as unrelated to
the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, and he insisted
original intent was the test for how the Constitution should be construed.
Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan was a problem for Mr. Berger,
because Howard introduced the Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate on
behalf of the Joint Committee that drafted it. Senator Howard clearly
said that the Amendment’s “privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States” included the guarantees of the Bill of Rights; the
Fourteenth Amendment clearly said that “no state shall . . . abridge”
these privileges or immunities. So Berger sought to discredit Howard as
Slaughter-house is consistent with requiring states to obey most guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
23. E.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2
STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). For a critical review of approaches to Reconstruction history, see
generally, PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION (1999).
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unrepresentative. To do so, he cited Benjamin Kendrick, one of the
historians who followed the Southern elite’s approach to Reconstruction
history. Mr. Berger wrote, “Howard, according to Kendrick, was ‘one of
the most . . . reckless of the radicals,’ who had ‘served consistently in the
vanguard of the extreme Negrophiles.’”24 Similarly, Mr. Berger
launched verbal attacks against John A. Bingham of Ohio—the primary
author of Section one and the subject of this symposium. Berger’s
attacks were designed to show that statements by Bingham supporting
the intent to apply the Bill of Rights to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment were also unreliable. Bingham, he said, was “muddled,”
“inept,”25 veered “as crazily as a rudderless ship” and was “unable to
understand what he read.”26 Finally, Berger asserted that there was “no
inkling” that the North had become dissatisfied with the protections the
states afforded to Bill of Rights liberties from 1789 to 1866.27
As a matter of historical fact, this last assertion is simply, utterly,
grossly, and demonstrably wrong. But Mr. Berger’s pronouncement is a
powerful witness for another proposition. Its publication in a 1977
book from the Harvard University Press brilliantly illuminates the
lingering effects of the successful repression of the story of the clash
between slavery on one side and liberty and democracy on the other.
Berger’s book shows how most Americans had long forgotten a crucial
part of their history—that slavery (and the caste system that replaced it)
threatened Bill of Rights liberties such as free speech, free press, free
exercise of religion, freedom from unreasonable searches, and freedom
from cruel and unusual punishments. Many had also forgotten that
Southern states targeted speech and press on behalf of Lincoln’s
Republican party for suppression.28 In sum, Government by Judiciary
shows how utterly many had also forgotten that slavery and the caste
system that was its legacy threatened the most basic requirements for
democratic government.
Of course, the Republicans who framed the post Civil War

24. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 147 (1977) (hereinafter GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY).
25. Id. at 145, 219.
26. Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine
Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L. J. 435, 460 (1982).
27. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 24, at 182.
28. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at Chapters 12 and 13. See also, e.g., CLEMENT
EATON, THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD SOUTH (revised ed. 1964) (focusing on
events in the Southern states) ; RUSSELL B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE
SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 1830-1860 (1949); W. SHERMAN SAVAGE, THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE
DISTRIBUTION OF ABOLITION LITERATURE 1830-1860 (1968).
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amendments had not forgotten the suppressions of civil liberty in the
interest of slavery that rocked the nation from 1835-1860. There are
many actors in this long forgotten story. One of the most important is
John A. Bingham, congressman from Ohio.
So I will discuss John A. Bingham’s understanding liberty under
the Constitution. Bingham was a Nineteenth Century human being.
Like others from the Nineteenth Century, not all of his ideas met
Twenty-first Century standards. There are respects in which he has
“failed to keep up with the times as a result of being dead.”29
Bingham was not perfect. But, of course, neither were other
founders who have been enshrined in the pantheon of constitutional
heroes. Far more than most, Bingham made substantial and enduring
contributions to constitutional liberty. Bingham has important things to
teach us. Had we been able to follow more consistently where Bingham
was trying to lead, we might have had a freer and more democratic
nation in the years after the Civil War.
The tide of public attention is turning.30 A growing group of
29. The phrase comes from Russell Baker.
30. A number of legal studies have focused on the historical background of the fourteenth
amendment with regard to guarantees of civil liberty. Typically these have built on prior work and
offered new evidence and interpretation as well. For an early scholarly study, see HORACE E.
FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908, 1965). For two pioneering
studies of anti-slavery influence, see HOWARD J. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION (1968)
and JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (enlarged ed., 1965). Both examined anti-slavery
origins of the fourteenth amendment. Crosskey built on their insights and added powerful
additional research and analysis in William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, “Legislative
History,” and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954).
Analysis of the issue was further advanced in Alfred Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: The
Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1968) and Robert J. Kaczorowski,
Searching for the Intent of the Framers of Fourteenth Amendment, 5 CONN. L. REV. 368 (1972-73).
RICHARD H. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES
1837-1860 (1976) provides an excellent survey of the rise of the political anti-slavery movement.
For a very important study of early anti-slavery legal thought, see WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE
SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977).
My own work was heavily influenced by Crosskey and my understanding of the subject
evolved over time. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority:
A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45 (1980); Michael Kent Curtis, The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 14 CONN. L. REV. 237 (1982); Michael Kent Curtis,
Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1982). For a critique of Mr. Berger’s work, see Aviam Soifer,
Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger’s History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1979). For
an overview of this period of American Legal History and significant additional analysis of the
meaning of the first section of the fourteenth amendment, see HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M.
WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 386-438
(1982). See also Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 235 (1984). A broad history and critical analysis of the
incorporation issue appears in NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15. A very important and

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 2
NEWCURTIS.DOC

7/28/03 11:48 AM

626

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:617

scholars is focusing on Bingham. In March of 2000, the Library of
Congress held a symposium on John Bingham that was broadcast on CSpan. In 2002, the University of Akron School of Law devoted this
symposium and an issue of its law review to John Bingham. Soon,
perhaps John A. Bingham will return to the great story of American
liberty after long years of exile. Perhaps in 2006, there will be a John A.
Bingham postage stamp commemorating the framing of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or a posthumous congressional medal, or some other token
of recognition.
There are many places one might start the story of John A.
Bingham and constitutional liberty. I will start with two speeches
Bingham made in the House of Representatives in 1856. Both grew out
of the controversy in Kansas.
II. JOHN BINGHAM AND THE FIREEATERS
In 1854, Congress repealed the Missouri Compromise banning
slavery north of thirty-six degrees, thirty minutes. Under the Kansas
Nebraska Act, each territory was to decide for itself whether to accept or
reject slavery. Kansas erupted into civil war between pro and antislavery factions. The repeal of the Missouri Compromise had created a
insightful article by Akhil Amar added still more evidence and fresh interpretation. See Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992) and was
followed by his luminous book, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
An important article by Richard Aynes is a powerful answer to the ad hominem attacks on Bingham
which, unhappily, have been too prominent in discussion of the incorporation issue. See Richard
Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993).
See also, Richard Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 70
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1197 (1995). For important scholarship denying application of the Bill of Rights
to the States under the fourteenth amendment, see RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989) and WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988). Scholars who have concluded that
incorporation was intended have included writers of all political persuasions. In addition to
Professor Avins, the most recent “conservative” to support incorporation is EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL
RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869 (1990). Most students of the subject who
have studied it in detail have concluded that some form of application to the states of all
constitutional guarantees of personal liberty was probably intended by the framers of the fourteenth
amendment. These include Flack, Crosskey, Avins, Curtis, Hyman and Wiecek, Kaczorowski,
Maltz, Amar, and Aynes. Berger and Nelson deny any incorporation. Fairman, TenBroek,
Guminski, and Graham opt for some form of selective incorporation. Charles Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN L.
REV. 5 (1949); Arnold T. Guminski, The Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of the American
People: A Disjunctive Theory of Selective Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 7 WHITTIER L. REV.
765 (1985). For a lively popular history of the fourteenth amendment, see HOWARD N. MEYER,
THE AMENDMENT THAT REFUSED TO DIE (rev. ed. 1978). There are many important more recent
works, but for the moment I will stop here.
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new political party, the Republican party, almost overnight. Kansas was
a central issue for Republicans, whose party had been formed to oppose
extension of slavery into the territories. Debate over Kansas dominated
the Congress.
In 1856, the Congress debated the admission of Kansas to statehood
under a pro-slavery government installed by the John Tyler
administration. Kansas had two “elected” state governments—a proslavery one supported by the Administration and a free state one elected
by a majority of the voters of the state. Democrats favored admitting
Kansas to the Union under its slave state Constitution. Republicans
wanted to admit Kansas as a free state, under a free state constitution.
Charles Sumner, the abolitionist Senator from Massachusetts, made
a speech on the “Crime Against Kansas.” In his oration, Sumner
referred to a speech by South Carolina’s Senator Andrew P. Butler’s in
favor of the slave state government. Sumner described Butler as a “Don
Quixote” who had chosen “the harlot, Slavery” as “his mistress to whom
he has made his vows.”31 Sumner’s speech caused an uproar. Even
some Republicans had reservations about his rhetoric.
Two days after Sumner’s speech and shortly after the Senate ended
its session for the day, Congressman Preston Brooks, a cousin of
Andrew Butler, came to the floor of the Senate. Brooks beat Sumner
(his legs trapped under his bolted down Senate desk) over the head thirty
times with a gold topped cane. Finally, Sumner wrenched the desk free
from the floor and then collapsed, his head covered with blood.
Southerners cheered Brooks. In his congressional speech against
the attack on Sumner, a disgusted Bingham quoted the Richmond
Enquirer of June 2, 1856, which said:
[i]n the main the press of the South applauded the conduct of Mr.
Brooks without condition or limitation. Our approbation is . . . entire
and unreserved. . . . [The act was] good in conception, better in
execution, and best of all in consequence. These vulgar Abolitionists
in the Senate are getting above themselves. . . . They have grown
saucy. . . . They must be lashed into submission.32

Bingham saw the attack on Sumner as an attack on constitutional
liberty. The Constitution provided in Article I, Section six that “for any
speech or Debate in either House, [senators or representatives] shall not
be questioned in any other place.” Bingham rejected the claim that the
31. JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 150 (1988).
32. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong. 1st Sess. 1580 (1856). [Hereinafter citations to the
Congressional Globe will be in the form: GLOBE, supra note 32, 34(1) 1580 (1856)].
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privilege applied only during an actual session of the Senate and that in
any case it did not reach Brooks’ assault. For him, “The freedom of
speech and the security of person are upon trial to-day. These great
rights underlie and are essential to all representative government.
[W]ithout their observance there can be no free Constitution and no free
people.”33
The attack on Sumner was an assault on “the great privilege of the
people, . . . the freedom of speech and debate in their legislative
assembles, and the absolute immunity of their representatives from
outrage, or insult, or menace in their exercise thereof.”34
In addition, all the people, including Senators and Representatives,
had a right “to be secure in their persons” under the Fourth
Amendment.35 For Bingham, Brooks was guilty not only of assault and
battery, but also an act of contempt against the Congress.
While a majority report from a House committee favored
disciplining Brooks, the minority report held that the constitutional
power to punish a member for disorderly behavior was limited to
behavior that disrupted an actual session of the House or Senate.
Furthermore, Brooks’ defenders said the speech and debate protection
was limited to “proper and legitimate” speeches, and Sumner’s speech
was neither. As Bingham saw it, the minority was reading the
Constitutional protection as follows:
Each House may punish, or by a vote of two thirds expel, a member for
disorderly behavior committed while the House is in session . . . [and]
The Senators and Representatives, for any proper and legitimate
speech or debate in either House, shall not be legally questioned in any
other place. . . . but neither House may punish . . . any member or
person for illegally questioning, when neither House is actually sitting,
any Senator or Representative for any speech or debate. . . .
In other words, by this new version of the Constitution, this House is
powerless to punish any of its members who may choose, within an
hour after the close of its session of each day, to question a fellow
member for words uttered in debate, by waylaying him, and clubbing
him until he is literally senseless and drenched in blood.36

According to Bingham, Brooks confessed his crime against the
people when he said his purpose was to punish Sumner for words
33.
34.
35.
36.

GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(1) 1577 (1856).
Id. at 1578.
Id.
Id.
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spoken in debate in the Senate.37 The attack was part of a larger attack
on freedom of speech. Without “free representative government, free
speech, and free men” that nation would be “a world without a sun.”38
The proposal to expel Brooks got 121 yes votes to 95 no votes;
short of the constitutionally required two-thirds. All but one of the
Southern representatives voted no. Brooks resigned, ran for re-election,
and won.39
Earlier, in March of 1856, Bingham had spoken in Congress on the
Kansas contested election and expressed his concern with free speech
and constitutional liberty. Two delegates each claimed to be the one true
representative to Congress for the government of Kansas. The defenders
of the pro-slavery government insisted that the candidate representing
the slave state government was named in accordance with laws passed
by the pro-slavery territorial assembly. The free state claimant, they
said, was estopped to challenge the Territorial laws.
This claim led Bingham to examine other laws passed by the proslavery Assembly. The Kansas laws made it a felony punishable by
death to carry slaves belonging to another out of the territory “with
intent to effect the freedom of such slave.” Similarly, the death penalty
was provided for those who “aid[ed] in persuading” such an act. Aiding
or harboring an escaping slave in the territory was a five year felony.40
The Kansas Assembly’s laws also targeted those expressing antislavery views. It was a felony “to print, or circulate, or publish, or aid in
printing, circulating or publishing” in the Territory “any book, paper,
pamphlet, magazine, handbill, or circular, containing any sentiment
calculated to induce slaves to escape from the service of their masters.”
Similarly the pro-slavery territorial assembly had made it a felony for
free persons, “by speaking or writing, to assert that persons have not the
right to hold slaves” in the Territory.41 By targeting anti-slavery speech,
Kansas was following a trail blazed by the slave states. The slave states
had laws punishing speech that (if it reached slaves) would tend to make
them discontent. The fact that the speech was directed only to white
citizens and reached no slaves was no defense.42
37. Id. at 1580.
38. Id.
39. DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS 221 at n. 44 (1976). GLOBE, supra note 32, at
34(1) 1349, 1627-1628; GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(1) App. 831-833, 34(1) 1863.
40. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(1) Appendix 124, col. 1 (Mar. 6, 1856) (emphasis in
original).
41. Id. at App. 124, col. 1 & 2 (emphasis in original).
42. See State v. Worth, 52 N.C. 488 (1860); CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19 at chapter
13.
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Bingham insisted the territorial legislation was void because “it is
not constitutional to restrict the freedom of speech within the Territories
of the United States.” Quoting John Milton, he said that “any territorial
enactment which makes it a felony for a citizen of the United States,
within the territory of the United States ‘to know, to argue, and to utter
freely, according to conscience,’” was void because it violated “that
provision of the Constitution which declares that the Congress . . . shall
not pass any law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.”43
Since Congress could not abridge freedom of speech, neither could its
creature, the territorial assembly. Bingham was dismayed by the Kansas
gag laws. He said:
Congress is to abide by this statute, which makes it [a] felony for a
citizen to utter or publish in that Territory “any sentiment calculated to
induce slaves to escape from the service of their masters.” Hence it
would be [a] felony there to utter the strong words of Algernon Sidney,
“resistence to tyrants is obedience to God;” a felony to say with
Jefferson, “I have sworn upon the alter of my God eternal hostility to
tyranny in every form over the mind and body of man;” a felony to
utter there, in the hearing of a slave, upon American soil, beneath the
American flag, the words of flame which shook the stormy soul of
Henry, “Give me liberty or give me death;” a felony to read in the
hearing of one of those fettered bondmen the words of the Declaration,
“All men are born free and equal, and endowed by their Creator with
inalienable rights of life and liberty;” . . . a felony to harbor a slave
escaping from his thraldom; a felony to aid freedom in its flight. . . .
Before you hold this enactment to be law, burn our immortal
Declaration and our free-written Constitution, fetter our free press, and
finally penetrate the human soul, and put out the light of that
understanding which the . . . Almighty hath kindled.44

Bingham concluded that the Kansas laws were unconstitutional in
two respects: they abridged freedom of speech and of the press and
deprived persons of liberty without due process of law. In contrast, he
said the Constitution expressly provided that ‘“Congress shall make no
law abridging freedom of speech or of the press;’ and it expressly
prescribes that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.’”45

43. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(1) App. 124, col. 2.
44. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(1) App. 124 (col.2-3) (emphasis in original).
45. Id. at App.124, col.3.
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III. BINGHAM, DUE PROCESS AND SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES
Bingham, like other Republicans, read the Due Process Clause to
outlaw slavery in the national territories. New states beyond the original
thirteen were “equal in respect of all the great and essential rights of a
free Commonwealth, in respect of all rights sanctioned by the
Constitution and consonant with its spirit” and equally had the right to
“secure to each and every person therein the absolute enjoyment of the
rights of human nature.”46 But new states formed “under and by virtue of
the Constitution may [not] enslave its own children, and sell them like
cattle.”47
Bingham was a highly regarded lawyer.48 His constitutional
arguments creatively wove together clauses of the Constitution and
English and American constitutional history.
The original states and new states were not equal in “the right to do
wrong,” in the “privilege to trample on the rights of humanity.” As
Bingham saw it, constitutional protections for slavery were the unique
possession of the original slave states.49 This view dovetailed with his
view (and that of the Republican party)50 that slavery in the territories
deprived the persons held as slaves of their liberty without due process
of law.
Bingham noted that the Constitutional Convention had rejected a
provision for admission of new states on the same terms with the
original states. Before that, when the Continental Congress had
provided for admission of new states from the Northwest Territory, it
required the new states to adhere to certain unalterable conditions.
These included perpetual guarantees of jury trial, habeas corpus, a
provision that the governments must be republican, a prohibition on
taking private property for public use without compensation, and finally
a ban on slavery. These provisions, he pointed out, were reenacted by
the first Congress under the new Constitution.51
Bingham supported his citation to the general provisions of the
Northwest Ordinance with a specific case. The Act to allow Ohio to

46. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(3) App. 136, col.2-3 (Jan. 13, 1857).
47. Id. at App. 136, col.3.
48. In 1866, the New York Times referred to Bingham and James Wilson as “among the most
learned and talented” members of the House. CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15,
at 120-21.
49. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(3) App. at 136, col. 3.
50. NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1956 at 27 (complied by Kirk H. Porter and Donald
B. Johnson (1956).
51. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(3) at App.137, col.2-3.
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form a constitution and to be admitted into the Union allowed its people
to form a state government “provided the same shall be republican, and
not repugnant to the [Northwest] ordinance.”52 These limitations on
Ohio and other states continued after their admission. So Bingham
concluded that similar limits “may and should be imposed by Congress”
on territories.53
Representatives of slave states insisted that the states had equal
rights in the territories (which were common property of all the states).
Therefore, slave owners had a right to bring their slaves into all the
national territories. In contrast, Bingham insisted that the territories
belonged to the nation, not to the states. The equal right of states to
establish their institutions within the territories was impossible. “The
slaveholding states assert that men are property; the non-slaveholding
states assert that men are not property, and cannot and shall not be made
property!”54
At any rate, Bingham said slavery in the territories violated the
letter and spirit of the Constitution:
You may call the State which enslaves and sells its own children, and
manacles the hand which feeds and clothes and shelters it, republican;
but truth, and history, and God’s eternal justice will call it
despotism. . . . I deny the constitutional right of any class of men . . .
to establish such a government within the national Territories, under
and by force of the national Constitution, because such a Government
is subversive of the great objects for which that Constitution was
ordained and violative of its spirit. . . .
[T]he absolute equality of all, and the equal protection of each, are
principles of our Constitution, which ought to be observed and
enforced in the organization and admission of new States. The
Constitution provides . . . that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. It makes no
distinction either on account of complexion or birth–it secures these
rights to all persons within its exclusive jurisdiction. This is equality.
It protects not only life and liberty, but also property, the product of
labor. It contemplates that no man shall be wrongfully deprived of the
fruit of his toil any more than of his life. The Constitution also
provides that no title of nobility shall be granted by the United States,
nor by any State of the Union. Why this restriction? Was it not
because all are equal under the Constitution; and that no distinctions
52. Id. at App.138, col.1.
53. Id. at App. 139, col.1.
54. Id. at App.139, col.1.
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should be tolerated except those which merit originates. . . . It is an
announcement of the equality and brotherhood of the human race.55

Read quite literally, the Due Process Clause supports Bingham’s
claim. At least, it does so if one accepts the idea that deprivation of
liberty requires a judicial process–which no slaves had enjoyed before
being deprived of liberty. The due process claim also assumed that a
better justification for deprivation of liberty would be required than the
fact that one was descended from victims of kidnaping. Blacks were
held in slavery in the Kansas territory, but their enslavement and that of
their ancestors had never been the result of a due process hearing or
based on crime. Instead, slavery originated in the forcible seizure of
Africans, and the system was perpetuated by force.
IV. BINGHAM ON CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR AMERICAN
CITIZENS–INCLUDING FREE BLACKS.
Again in 1859, Bingham discussed the effect of the Due Process
Clause in the territories. He spoke against a bill to admit the Oregon
territory as a state. This time, however, Bingham addressed the
protection he believed the Due Process Clause afforded to free blacks in
the national territories.
Bingham believed that the people of Oregon had an inherent right
to form a constitution and seek admission as a state, even without an
enabling act from Congress.
The right was inherent in their
constitutional right to petition and in the idea of republican government.
While the people of the Oregon territory had the right to frame a
constitution for themselves, “they must so exercise that right as not to
embody in their constitution provisions repugnant to the Constitution of
the United States, violative of the rights of citizens of the United
States.”56 That, as Bingham understood it, was exactly what Oregon had
done. The Oregon constitution forbade free blacks to enter Oregon or to
remain there, to maintain court actions, or to own property in the state.
“I know, sir,” Bingham said, “that some gentlemen have a short and
easy method of disposing of such objections as these.” These gentlemen
assumed, “that the people of the State, after admission, may, by
changing their constitution, insert therein every objectionable feature
which, before admission, they were constrained to omit.” Bingham
denied that new states had the right to infringe on the Constitution and

55. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(3) App. 140, col. 1.
56. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 35(2) 982, col.1 & 2 (1859).
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the rights of citizens. But he thought the Constitution failed to provide
any mechanism for enforcement of the citizens’ rights. As a result, he
did not deny that states might exercise the power to violate basic rights
of citizens in the Bill of Rights. He knew that many assumed that the
new state had “the sole power over persons and property within its
territorial limits” and might pass laws “however odious and
unconstitutional.”57
Bingham challenged the assumption. “[A]ny State constitution, or
State law, which conflicts with the Constitution of the United States and
impairs any right, political or personal, guarantied thereby” was void
because it violated the Supremacy Clause. “To the right understanding
of the limitation of the Constitution of the United States upon the several
States, it ought not to be overlooked that, whenever the Constitution
guaranties to its citizens a right, either natural or conventional, such
guarantee is in itself a limitation upon the States. . . .”58
To a great degree, that is the law today. But how did Bingham
understand it to be the law in 1859? In 1859, the Fourteenth
Amendment (ratified in 1868) did not exist, and the Supreme Court’s
broad acceptance of the incorporation doctrine was not yet a gleam in
the eye of Justice Black. That doctrine grew from a judicial acorn in
1925 to an oak by the end of the 1960s, but it had limited judicial
support in 1859.59
First, Bingham assumed that “[a]ll free persons born and domiciled
within the jurisdiction of the United States, are citizens of the United
States from birth.” Bingham supported this assertion with citations from
text writers such as Rawle and Chancellor Kent.60 But, Bingham noted,
the Constitution did not merely protect citizens. “[N]atural and inherent
rights, which belong to all men irrespective of all conventional
regulations, are by this constitution guarantied by the broad and
comprehensive word ‘person,’ as contradistinguished from the limited
term ‘citizens.’” Here Bingham cited the text of “the fifth article of

57. Id. at 982, col.2.
58. Id. at 982, col.3.
59. It did have some. E.g., Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846); Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353
(1852). See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1118-1121 (2000)
[hereinafter Curtis, Historical Linguistics]; William W. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, Legislative
History, and the Constitutional Limits on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 141-42 (1954);
CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15, at 24 & 25 n. 36 (second printing, 1987). See
also, AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 169, 154-55,
177, 189 (1998), for a luminous discussion.
60. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 35(2) 983, col.1.
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amendments . . . that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property but by due process of law, nor shall private property be taken
without just compensation.’” He continued: “And this guarantee applies
to all citizens within the United States.” The Supremacy Clause was a
limit “upon State sovereignty–simple, clear and strong. No State may
rightfully . . . impair any of these guarantied rights. . . They may not
rightfully or lawfully declare that the strong citizens may deprive the
weak citizens of their rights, natural or political. . . .”61
Bingham has still not explained exactly how he thinks the rights of
citizens enumerated in the Constitution limit the states. The answer is
coming.
One of Bingham’s objections to the Oregon constitution was that it
allowed aliens to vote, a provision he thought unconstitutional. But that
was not his main objection.
But, sir, there is a still more objectionable feature than alien suffrage in
this Oregon constitution. That is the provision . . . which declares that
large number of the citizens of the United States shall not, after the
admission of . . . Oregon, come or be within said state: that they shall
hold no property there and that they shall not prosecute any suits in any
of the courts of the state; and that the legislature shall, by statute, make
it a penal offense for any person to harbor any of the excluded class of
their fellow-citizens who may thereafter come or be within the
state. . . . I deny that any State may exclude a law abiding citizen of the
United States from coming within its Territory, or abiding therein, . . .
from the enjoyment therein of the “privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States.

At this point Bingham cited Article IV, Section two: “The citizens
of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several States.” He insisted that the “citizens of each State, all the
citizens of each State, being citizens of the United States, shall be
entitled to ‘all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States.’” These were “[n]ot the rights and immunities of the several
states.” They were not “those constitutional rights and immunities
which result exclusively from State authority or State legislation.”
Instead they were “all privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States in the several States. There is an ellipsis in the language
employed in the Constitution, but its meaning is self-evident that it is
‘the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the

61. Id. at 983, col.3.
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several States’ that it guaranties.”62
Bingham insisted that,
the persons thus excluded from the State by this section of the Oregon
constitution, are citizens by birth of the several States, and therefore
are citizens of the United States, and as such are entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, amongst
which are the rights of life, and liberty and property, and their due
protection in the enjoyment thereof by law; and therefore I hold this
section for their exclusion from that State and its courts, to be an
infraction of that wise and essential provision of the national
Constitution to which I before referred to wit: “The citizen of each
states shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several states.”63

As Bingham interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, it protected all rights of citizens of the United States in every
state. When, in 1791, the nation added the Bill of Rights to the
Constitution, new privileges and immunities or rights were created and
these after acquired privileges and immunities, Bingham thought, were
protected by the broad language of the original clause of Article IV.64
Bingham rejected the claim that these rights were limited to whites.
He pointed to a proposed “whites only” amendment to the Articles of
Confederation that had been voted down in the Continental Congress.
South Carolina had proposed to limit to white citizens the protection of
the privileges and immunities provision in the Articles of Confederation
(the predecessor of Article IV), but the proposal had been rejected. 65
The refusal to limit the privileges of citizens under the Articles to whites
was followed by the Constitution’s declaration that the new body politic
was made up of “the people of the United States.” This meant “all the
free inhabitants of the United States, whether white or black, not even
excepting, as did the Articles of Confederation, paupers, vagabonds, or

62. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 35(2) 984, col.1. By 1871, when the protection for privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States was in Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Bingham seemed to accept the orthodox judicial interpretation of Article IV privileges. Globe,
supra note 32, at 42(1) App. 84, col. 2-3. Bingham subsequently introduced a bill to give
corporations the protection of the privileges of guaranteed by the Constitution to the citizens of the
several states—apparently, Article IV privileges. Id. Presumably the bill was an attempt to give
them pretty much what they now enjoy under the Court’s interpretation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause. See, GLOBE, supra note 32, at 41(1) 396.
63. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 35(2) 984, col.3.
64. William W. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, “Legislative History,” and the Constitutional
Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954).
65. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 35(2) 984, col.3.
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fugitives from justice.”66 In addition, he noted that free blacks had voted
in a number of the states at the time of the Constitution, adding further
support to his claim that they were citizens of the United States.67
After the ratification of the Constitution, all “free inhabitants,
irrespective of age, or sex, or complexion, and their descendants, were
citizens of the United States. No distinctions were made against the
poor and in favor of the rich, or against the free born blacks and in favor
of the whites.” As a result, “[t]his government rests upon the absolute
equality of natural rights amongst men.” Political rights, he admitted,
were a different matter.68
Bingham protested “against the attempt to mar that great charter of
our rights, almost divine in its conception and in its spirit of equality, by
the interpolation into it of any word of caste, such as white, or black,
male or female. . . .” The Constitution rested on the rock of the
“equality of all to the right to live; to the right to know; to argue and to
utter, according to conscience; to work and enjoy the product of their
toil. . . . The charm of that Constitution lies in the great democratic idea
which it embodies, that all men, before the law, are equal in respect of
those rights of person which God gives and no man or State may
rightfully take away. . . .”69
The Supreme Court had held to the contrary in the Dred Scott case,
but Bingham had a low opinion of that decision and at any rate did not
consider it binding on his independent duty to construe and uphold the
Constitution.70 Judicial decisions were binding on the parties to a case,
but they could not preclude the right of the people’s representatives to
seek to enforce the Constitution as they understood it. On another
occasion, Bingham noted that judges could abuse their power. The
English “judicial monster,” Judge Jeffreys, Chief Justice of the King’s
Bench, “could boast a judicial massacre of three hundred and twenty
victims.” (Jeffrey’s was the judge who presided over the conviction of
Algernon Sidney, later a hero to American Revolutionaries, for writing a
book supporting republican government. Jeffries is widely regarded as
one of the worst judges in English history.) The experience of such past
judicial abuses precluded excessive deference to decisions of judges by

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 35(2) 985, col.1. These would, of course, include the right to
vote and hold office.
69. Id. at 985, col.2.
70. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(1) 1839. See also GLOBE, supra note 32, at 40(2) 483, col.2.
(1868).
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the people’s representatives. “With such an example before us, we, the
lineal descendants of those who witnessed and avenged Jeffreys’s
judicial crimes, are not to be told that the judiciary are, at pleasure, and
by the assumption of power, to bind the conscience and dispose of the
liberties and lives of the people!”71
A slim majority in the House voted to admit Oregon. The bill had
already passed the Senate, so Oregon was admitted.72 The Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and then the Fourteenth Amendment ratified in 1868
prohibited racist laws of the sort contained in the Oregon Constitution.
V. THE FIREEATERS REVISITED: FREE SPEECH ON THE EVE OF THE
CIVIL WAR
The controversy over slavery was a dispute about the deeper
meaning of our national story. It was a struggle for the nation’s soul.
Would the American constitutional system protect slavery or guarantee
liberty? The dispute was intense because slavery undermined liberty and
liberty threatened slavery. As slaveowners saw it, protection of the slave
system required suppression of dissent, search and destroy missions
aimed at anti-slavery publications, and whipping and prison for those
who criticized the system.
The dispute was intense in January of 1860, on the eve of the Civil
War. Nearly half of the Republicans in the House of Representatives
had endorsed a project to publish an abridged version of an anti-slavery
book by Hinton Helper. The book was to be a Republican campaign
document for the election of 1860.
In his book, Helper advocated abolition of slavery by democratic
action at the state level. He called on white Southerners to follow the
example of the Northern states and to eliminate slavery state by state.
Helper said change should be achieved by free speech and the ballot, by
the force of argument, not force of arms. But if slaveholders and “their
cringing lickspittles” used violence to suppress anti-slavery speech,
Helper said the advocates of emancipation should fight back. There
were, he pointed out, three non-slaveholders to each slaveholder, “not
counting the negroes who in nine cases out of ten would be delighted to
cut their masters throats.”73 The Southern elite and their Northern allies
were outraged by the book.
John Sherman, the Republican candidate for Speaker, had endorsed
71. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(1) 1839, col.3 (1860).
72. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 35(2) 1010 and 1011.
73. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at 271-74.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss4/2

22

Curtis: The Story of American Liberty
NEWCURTIS.DOC

2003]

7/28/03 11:48 AM

THE STORY OF AMERICAN LIBERTY

639

the plan to publish an abridged version of Helper’s book. As a result,
the battle over who would be Speaker of the House in 1859-1860
erupted into a battle over Helper’s book, slavery, abolition, and the
recent John Brown raid. Southern representatives contended (quite
inaccurately) that Brown’s raid was implicitly condoned by the course of
action advocated by the book. They also claimed that Republican
endorsers were accessories to John Brown’s crime. Several suggested
that like Brown, these Republican endorsers should be hung. Certainly
no endorser should be elected Speaker.74 One prominent Republican
endorser was John Bingham.
Congressman William Smith of Virginia insisted that Bingham, as
one of the endorsers, deserved “the detestation and scorn and indignation
of every party and every man in the American Union.” At this point the
report in the Congressional Globe noted “applause in the galleries.” In
response to Congressman Smith’s attack, Bingham asked Smith if he
repudiated “the self evident truths of the Declaration, that all men are
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights, among which are the right to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. . . .” Bingham’s question was pertinent. The
Helper book reprinted anti-slavery statements from Thomas Jefferson,
from Southerners of the Founding generation, and from Virginians in
their 1832 state debate over ending slavery. Smith responded: “the
gentleman refers to the sentiments of distinguished revolutionary men,
and asks me if I repudiate them. Sir, many of those sentiments, of
course, I repudiate. [Derisive laughter from the Republicans.] Many of
those sentiments are false in philosophy and untrue in fact.”75 By this
time a number of Southern congressmen had explicitly disowned the
Declaration’s assertion that all men are created equal.76
Bingham had said the Framers repudiated the use of the term
slavery. Smith asked if the fugitive slave clause did not disprove the
claim. “What was it there for? Tell me; tell me. Speak. I demand that
you. . .stand up here and respond to my question.” Bingham rejoined,
“Whenever the gentleman addresses me as his peer I will respond; but I
wish him to know that I am not his slave.” Smith rejoined, “I would
make you do better if you were. [Laughter.] You would get what you
need.”77
74. Id. at chapter 12.
75. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(1) 436, col.3.
76. E.g., CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at 296 (Statement of Senator James Chestnut);
cf. also the statement of Alexander Stephens, in McPherson, supra note 5.
77. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(1) 437, col.1.
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As Bingham noted, Southerners and some Northern Democrats
were attempting “to arraign and condemn sixty of their peers here as the
aiders and inciters of treason, insurrection, and murder; and this, too,
without giving the accused a hearing, without testimony. . . .” It was, he
said, an attempt “to enforce mob law on this floor,” a reference to the
Northern mobs that had tried to silence opponents of slavery in the
decades before the Civil War.78
Bingham’s free speech concerns were part of the common faith of
the Republican party. In the debate over Helper’s book, Republicans in
the Senate voted for a resolution that upheld the right of free speech on
slavery and all topics of state and national concern: “[F]ree discussion of
the morality and expediency of slavery should never be interfered with
by the law of any State, or of the United States; and the freedom of
speech and of the press on this and every other subject of domestic and
national policy, should be maintained inviolate in all the States.”79
For Bingham, free speech was a central part of the controversy over
slavery. President Buchanan and his party blamed sectional strife on the
Republicans. Bingham responded that “sectional strife will never be
allayed” by “the attempt, here or elsewhere, either by national or by
State legislation, to enact sedition laws, by which to fetter the
conscience, or stifle the convictions, of American citizens.”80 Again and
again, Bingham noted the denials of free speech and press that
accompanied slavery. “Mr. Underwood was driven away from the State
of Virginia” because “as a citizen of the State, he insisted on the right of
discussing this [slavery] question among her people, and dared to attend
the Republican convention” of 1856 in Philadelphia. Similarly, a large
pro-slavery mob had assembled to prevent citizens from holding a
Republican party meeting in Wheeling, Virginia.81 Bingham said these
events proceeded from mercenary considerations. “It is the wealthy men
of the South who have their investments in slaves, who ostracize the
friends of emancipation. . . .” These men feared that “if free speech is
tolerated and free labor protected by law,” it “would bring into disrepute
the system of slave labor, and bring about, if you please, gradual
emancipation, thereby interfering with the profits of these gentlemen.”82
By 1860, Southern states were treating anti-slavery speech as
criminal. Bingham noted that it had not always been so. In the 1830s,
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36 (1) 1837, col.1 (1860).
CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at 286-87.
GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36 (1) 1837, col.2.
GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(1) 1861, col.2.
Id. at 1861, col.3.
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Maryland, Kentucky, and Virginia had openly debated abolishing the
institution, but faced with the danger of emancipation, the Southern elite
renewed sectional strife.83 “[T]o maintain as a finality . . . [the fugitive
slave law of 1850] this sectional party attempted to muzzle the press,
and stifle the lowest whisper of the national conscience. . . .”84
In January 1861, Bingham spoke in the House against a
compromise measure proposed in an effort to avert civil war. Bingham
feared that one provision would be construed to allow for federal
extradition for trial in the Southern states of those who spoke or wrote
against slavery or aided those who had–and whose words reached or
were uttered in the South. This was no idle concern. In North Carolina,
Daniel Worth, a minister who distributed copies of the Helper book, had
been convicted of a felony and sentenced to prison. After Worth’s trial,
the North Carolina legislature changed its law against “incendiary
documents” to provide capital punishment for the first offense. Nor was
North Carolina satisfied with prosecuting local “agitators.” A North
Carolina grand jury had called for the extradition of Northern
Republican endorsers of the Helper book.
In response to the danger that the federal government might
legislate for extradition, Bingham denied “that citizens of the United
States are to be made liable, by force of Federal law, for merely political
offenses against the States.” Why? “Because it is written in the
Constitution that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech or the freedom of the press.” As a result, Congress could not
provide for the rendition of a person who had taught a South Carolina
slave to read nor could it enforce the extradition of a person who had
published “an article against slavery, contrary to the statutes of that
state.”85
For Bingham, suppression of free speech was part of a larger attack
on liberty in the interests of slavery. Bingham summarized what he saw
as the aggressions of the slave power:
[T]he repeal of laws for the protection of freedom and free labor in the
Territories; the conquest of foreign territory for slavery; the admission
into the Union of a foreign slave state; the rejection by this sectional
party of the homestead bill; the restriction of the right of petition; the
restoration of fugitive slaves at national expense; the attempt to reward
slave pirates for kidnapping Africans; the attempt to acquire Cuba,
with her six hundred thousand slaves; the attempt to fasten upon an
83. Id. at 1837, col.3.
84. Id. at 1839, col.1
85. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(2) App. 84, col.1 (1861).
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unwilling people a slave constitution; the attempt to enact a sedition
law, thereby restricting the freedom of the press and the freedom of
speech, in direct violation of the Constitution . . .; and the attempt, by
extra-judicial interference to take away from the people and their
Representatives the power to legislate for freedom and free labor in the
Territories.86

From the 1850s to the eve of the Civil War, Bingham saw himself
defending basic American values under attack from the slave power–the
interrelated values of equality and basic constitutional rights. Soon,
however, the battle against the slave power entered a new, revolutionary,
and bloody phase.
VI. JOHN BINGHAM DURING THE CIVIL WAR
When the war came, Bingham and his Republican colleagues had
the chance to put their anti-slavery convictions into action. In April of
1862, John Bingham spoke in favor of a statute that abolished slavery in
the District of Columbia. By abolishing slavery in the District, Bingham
thought the Congress was making good on the promise of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Bingham noted that the Magna Charta of England differed widely
from “the broader and wiser provision of our own American Magna
Charta.” The English provision “only protected from unjust seizure,
imprisonment, disseizen, and banishment those fortunate enough to be
known as FREEMEN.” In contrast Bingham said, “our Constitution, the
new Magna Charta. . .rejects in its bill of rights the restrictive word
‘freeman,’ and adopts in its stead the more comprehensive words ‘no
person:’ thus giving protection to all, whether born free or bond.”87 (As
noted earlier, Bingham thought the Due Process Clause prevented
slavery in the territories and the District of Columbia where the power of
the national government was exclusive.)
The American Constitution provided that “‘no person shall be
deprived of life, or liberty, or property without due process of law.’ This
clear recognition of the rights of all was a new gospel to mankind,
something unknown to the men of the thirteenth century. . . .”88
The barons of England demanded the security of law for themselves;
the patriots of America proclaimed the security and protection for all.
[A]ll men are equal before the law. No matter upon what spot of the
86. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(1) 1840, col.2-3 (1860).
87. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 37(2) 1638, col.2 (1862).
88. Id.
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earth’s surface they were born; no matter whether an Asiatic or
African, a European or an American sun first burned upon them; no
matter whether citizens or strangers; no matter whether rich or poor; no
matter whether wise or simple; no matter whether strong or weak, this
new Magna Charta to mankind declares the rights of all to life and
liberty and property are equal before the law. . . .”89

Bingham noted that this provision unfortunately had been ignored
for sixty years in the Capital where the United States government had
exclusive jurisdiction. Now, however, “no person, no human being, no
member of the family of man shall, . . . under the sanction of the Federal
authority . . ., be deprived of his life, or his liberty, or his property, but
by the law of the land . . . the law of the whole people of United
States. . . .”90 Bingham said that the Due Process Clause was in keeping
with the spirit of the Declaration’s proclamation that all men are created
equal. The Declaration, in turn, was a reiteration of the Gospel’s
proclamation that God had “made of one blood all nations to dwell on
the face of the earth.”91
In this speech Bingham also reiterated his ellipsis theory. The
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV protected “all privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States. . . .
The great privilege and immunity of an American citizen to be respected
everywhere in this land, and especially in this District, is that they shall
not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.”92 Article IV, Bingham pointed out, protected the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states, not of the several states.93
The result was a body of national constitutional privileges and
immunities belonging to every citizen in every state.
Dred Scott notwithstanding, Congress voted to abolish slavery in
the nation’s capital. The House approved the Senate bill to free all
slaves in the District, and Lincoln signed the emancipation act on April
16, 1862.94
In times of war, traditional liberties are imperiled. On at least one
occasion, Bingham worked to limit broad government power in the
interest of the liberty of the citizen. The Lincoln administration had
suspended the writ of habeas corpus. People were detained without a
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
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statement of charges. On July 7, 1862, Bingham reported a bill from the
Judiciary Committee on the subject. It affirmed the suspension of the
writ, but required the administration to furnish a list of the names of
prisoners. It also required that prisoners who were held where the
federal courts were functioning should be charged before the end of the
term of the grand jury or released on taking an oath of allegiance.95
Bingham noted that the power to suspend the writ was subject to great
abuse, however the bill was worded. But he said that the bill was
important both for the protection of the executive and the protection of
the rights of the citizen.96 On the other hand, when some of Lincoln’s
generals suppressed anti-war speech, Bingham does not seem to have
joined the Republicans who protested the suppression.
VII. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM
With the end of the Civil War, the defeated Southern states ratified
the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery. After ratification, the
Southern states insisted they should be restored to representation in
Congress–with the increased political power that came from the
abolition of the Three-fifths Clause. Under the constitutional rule after
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, Southern blacks, though
disfranchised, would count as whole people for purposes of
representation. The rebels who had lost the war might win the peace,
riding to political victory on the backs of disfranchised blacks. Bingham
was a member of the Joint Committee that had been appointed to
consider conditions for re-admission, including constitutional
amendments. Like most Republicans, he insisted further constitutional
guarantees were necessary before Southern states could be re-admitted
to Congress.97
On January 25, 1866, Bingham defended one proposed guarantee, a
constitutional amendment to modify the apportionment of
representatives among the states. The proposal under discussion became
section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In its final form, it
proportionally reduced the representation of states that excluded any
portion of their adult male population from voting for any reason except
rebellion or other crime.
The provision faced strong opposition from those who sought to
secure the ballot to newly freed slaves. They claimed it legitimized
95. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 37(2) 3105, col.3-3106, col.1.
96. Id. at 3106, col.1.
97. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 429, col.1 & 2.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss4/2

28

Curtis: The Story of American Liberty
NEWCURTIS.DOC

2003]

7/28/03 11:48 AM

THE STORY OF AMERICAN LIBERTY

645

disfranchisement of the black men of the South. Bingham rejected the
claim. The amendment was a penalty for disfranchisement, he said, not
permission to do it.98
Bingham said no issue was more important than the basis of
representation would come before Congress unless it was “the great
question whether the Constitution shall be so amended as to give to
Congress power by statute law to enforce all of its guarantees!”99
Bingham prefaced his statement about enforcing all constitutional
guarantees with an example of the abuses he wished to correct. He
hoped that “amendments will be sent out to the people by which the
Congress may upon their ratification be empowered to provide by law
that hereafter no State shall make it a crime for a man, whether he be
black or white, a citizen of the Republic, to learn the alphabet of his
native tongue and his rights and duties.”100 Southern states, of course,
had made it a crime to teach slaves to read.
On February 26, 1866, Bingham introduced the proposed
amendment of which he had spoken (the February 26th version). It gave
Congress power to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states and to all persons in the
several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.
Because of the Supremacy Clause, Bingham said, states did not have the
right, though they had exercised the power, to deprive citizens of their
constitutional rights. “[T]his immortal bill of rights embodied in the
Constitution rested for its execution and enforcement hitherto on the
fidelity of the States.” The states, however, had “violated in every sense
of the word these provisions of the Constitution of the United States, the
enforcement of which are absolutely essential to American
nationality.”101
Bingham’s proposal faced several objections. Congressman Hale
of New York believed that the equal protection provision would allow
Congress to legislate on all subjects heretofore reserved to the states,
with the simple limit that the legislation must be equal. Hale thought it
could allow Congress to make the property rights of married women
equal to those of men–an issue he thought should be reserved for the
98. Id. at 432, col.1-3.
99. Id. at col. 3.
100. Id.
101. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1034, c.1-2. Some have claimed Bingham’s references to
“the Bill of Rights” meant not the Bill of Rights but only the due process clause and the privileges
and immunities clause of Article IV. The claim is a mistake. See, e.g., CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE, supra note 15, at 102. Note also Bingham’s reference to enforcing all the guarantees of
the Constitution, most of which are contained in the Bill of Rights. Id.
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states. Furthermore, Hale said the Bill of Rights cited by Bingham was a
limit on state and federal legislation, not a source of power. Bingham
agreed that under current law the Bill of Rights was a limit on power,
not a source of power. But, unlike Hale, Bingham was aware of the
Supreme Court’s decisions holding that the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights did not limit state power.
Bingham interrupted Hale to ask for a single decision requiring
states to allow the most basic form of due process. Had not the nation
been “dumb in the presence of” state laws that closed the courts of the
state to some American citizens denying them the right to prosecute a
suit. (Here Bingham was referring to laws like the Oregon law he had
opposed.) Hale said that he assumed, somehow or other, that the
Constitution protected the liberties of American citizens, but admitted
that he might be mistaken.102
In a later speech, Bingham summarized his proposal. It was
“simply a proposition to arm the Congress of the United States, by the
consent of the people of the United States, with the power to enforce the
bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution today.”103
Bingham quoted the two provisions of his proposed amendment.
His critics, he said, “admit the force of the provisions in the bill of
rights, that the citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the several
States, and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.” But they were opposed “to the
enforcement of the bill of rights, as proposed” because of the reserved
rights of the states. Bingham denied that any state had reserved to itself
the right, “under the Constitution of the United States, to withhold from
any citizen of the United States within its limits, under any pretext
whatever, any of the privileges of a citizen of the United States” or to
impose any burden on him contrary to the constitutional injunction “that
the citizen shall be entitled in the several States to all the immunities of a
citizen of the United States.”104 Bingham recognized that states had
exercised the power to deny these protections to citizens. But unlike
others, Bingham thought that Congress lacked the ability to correct these
abuses without a constitutional amendment.
Bingham said he had been asked if he could cite a decision showing
that “the power of the Federal Government to enforce in the United

102. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1064, col. 3.
103. Id. at 1088, col.3.
104. Id. at 1089, col.1.
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States courts the bill of rights under the articles of amendment to the
constitution had been denied.”105 Bingham had not been given the
chance to answer the question—specifically whether the Constitution
was adequate as it stood to protect the liberties of the citizen.106 Though
unable to discuss the question further during Hale’s speech, Bingham
answered it in a speech he made the very next day.
Bingham said the federal government could not enforce Bill of
Rights liberties against the states. To prove the point he cited Barron v.
Baltimore and Livingston v. Moore. In those cases, the Supreme Court
had held the guarantees of the Bill of Rights were merely limits on the
federal government and did not limit the states. “Is the bill of rights,”
Bingham asked, “to stand in our Constitution hereafter . . . a mere dead
letter?” While the government could protect “the personal liberty and all
the personal rights of the citizen on the remotest sea,” it lacked the
power “in time of peace to enforce the citizens’ rights to life, liberty, and
property within the limits of South Carolina” after the state was
readmitted.107
As Bingham (and other leading Republicans saw it) Congress
should have the power to protect citizens’ constitutional rights.
Bingham insisted the power was insufficient under the existing
Constitution. “A grant of power . . . is a very different thing from a bill
of rights.” Would anyone say “that the bill of rights confers express
legislative power on Congress to punish State officers for . . . flagrantly
unjust violations of the declared rights of every citizen and every free
man in every free State?”108
Republican critics of Bingham’s proposed amendment expressed
two concerns. The first was the fear that the amendment would allow
Congress to legislate on every imaginable subject, preempt all state laws,
and substitute the laws of Congress instead. The second was that
Bingham’s mere grant of power failed to secure fully the rights Bingham
was trying to protect. As Giles Hotchkiss put it, “we may pass laws here
to-day, and the next Congress may wipe them out. Where is your
guarantee then?”109 Hotchkiss wanted an express limit on the states that
hostile legislation could not override.110

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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VIII. THE CIVIL RIGHTS BILL: CONGRESSIONAL POWER ASSERTED
On February 28, 1866, the first version of Bingham’s amendment
was postponed, and Congress turned to the Civil Rights Bill. That bill
was a response to Black Codes passed by the Southern states. These
codes denied blacks rights to contract, own property, testify against
whites, live in towns, or even travel without permission from their
employers. In short, the Codes attempted to replace slavery with
serfdom. Some of the codes also had provisions that directly limited
rights of blacks to assemble, to speak, to preach and to bear arms. They
also inflicted cruel and unusual punishments on the transgressors.111
The Civil Rights Act, as finally passed, made all persons born in
the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United
States. It gave all citizens the same rights to contract, testify, and own
property as enjoyed by white citizens. It also guaranteed them the full
and equal benefit of all laws and provisions for the security of person
and property as enjoyed by white citizens.112 The phrase “laws for the
security of person and property” had long been understood to encompass
guarantees such as those in the Bill of Rights.113 A number of
111. 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 279-81 (Walter L. Fleming ed., 1906).
Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the SlaughterHouse Cases without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.
C. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1996).
112. Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
113. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. 393, 449-50; CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15, at
72. In Dred Scott, Taney noted that Congress could make no law respecting the establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech and of the press,
or the right to bear arms. These powers, he said, limit the power of the federal government over the
“person or property” of the citizen.
These powers, and others, in relation to rights of person. . .are in express and positive
terms, denied to the General Government; and the rights of private property have been
guarded with equal care. Thus the rights of property are united with the rights of person,
and placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which
provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450.
In the 1827 edition of his Commentaries, Kent notes that “[t]he right of personal security is
guarded by provisions which have been transcribed into the constitutions of this country from
Magna Charta, and other fundamental acts of the English Parliament, and it is enforced by
additional and more precise injunctions.” Kent proceeds to list guarantees such as grand jury
indictment, the protection against double jeopardy, the provision that no person shall be compelled
to be a witness against himself, and the guarantees of speedy and public trial, confrontation,
compulsory process, right to counsel, and against ex post facto laws. Kent explicitly noted the dual
nature of laws and provisions for the security of person. “[T]he personal security of every citizen is
protected from lawless violence, by the arm of government, and the terrors of the penal code;
and. . .it is equally guarded from unjust and tyrannical proceedings on the part of government itself,
by the provisions to which we have referred.” See, GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1117 and 1118,
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Republicans read the provisions of the Civil Rights Act to protect the
Bill of Rights liberties of American citizens in the states.114
In spite of Bingham’s view that Congress lacked the constitutional
power to pass the Civil Rights Bill, several distinguished Republican
lawyers in the House disagreed. They thought congressional power to
enforce the Bill of Rights did provide a source of power to pass the Civil
Rights Bill. One of these was James Wilson, chair of the House
Judiciary Committee. Wilson found congressional power to pass the
Civil Rights Act in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.115
He and other congressmen also relied on the power to enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment.
Ironically, Bingham opposed passage of the Civil Rights Bill. He
insisted that a constitutional amendment was necessary. “I do not,” he
said, “oppose any legislation which is authorized by the Constitution of
my country to enforce in its letter and spirit the bill of rights as
embodied in that Constitution. I know that enforcement of the bill of
rights is the want of the republic.”116 But, he said, under current law,
protection of these rights was reserved to the states.117 Bingham said he
agreed with Wilson “in an earnest desire to have the bill of rights in your
Constitution enforced everywhere.”118 But, he insisted, Congress simply
lacked the power without a constitutional amendment. Bingham would
make similar objections in 1867 to passage of a bill to forbid cruel and
unusual punishments in the states. He insisted that Congress needed to
wait until the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.

col.3 (Rep. Wilson) and 1757, col.3 (Sen. Trumbull) both citing Chancellor Kent. JAMES KENT, I
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW Lecture XXIV, 599-648 (New York: William Kent, 1854).
Robert Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 923, 932 (1986) (citing Kent). The references to the 1827
edition appear in JAMES KENT, II COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, Section XXIV, Of the
Absolute Rights of Persons, at 9-11 (1827).
114. CURTIS, supra note 19, at 373-74; GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 2332, col. 3 (Sen.
Dixon) (“Congress has given us, in the civil rights act, a guarantee for free speech in every part of
the Union.”); cf. also Id. at 2465, col. 1 (Rep. Thayer); Id. at 2468, col. 1 (Rep. Kelly, suggesting
that the provisions of section one—which include requiring states to accord due process—may
already be in the Constitution); Id. at 2539, col. 3 (Rep. Farnsworth—all provisions in section one
are in the Constitution already—which would include the due process clause as a limit on the
states—except for equal protection). CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 30, at 72, 104.
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 245 (1998); STEPHEN
P. HALBROOK, THE FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS,
1866-1876, at 31 and 60 (citing N.Y. EVENING POST, Apr. 7, 1866 at 2 col. 1(1998).
115. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1294, col.2 & 3 (Wilson).
116. Id. at 1291, col. 1.
117. Id. at 1291.
118. Id.
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Bingham continued to defend the February 26th version of his
amendment against federalism concerns. He said his amendment was
not designed to replace the states. It was simply designed to “punish all
violations by State officers of the bill of rights, but leaving those officers
to discharge their duties” in a way consistent with the oath to obey the
Constitution.119
In addition to his belief that Congress lacked the constitutional
power to pass it, Bingham objected to the Civil Rights Bill because it
failed to protect the due process rights of aliens. “Can such legislation
be sustained,” he asked, “by reason and conscience?”120 If the Supreme
Court was right, and the Bill of Rights did not limit the states, at least it
limited the federal government and protected aliens.121
IX. SECTION ONE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Bingham was nothing if not persistent. When his proposed
amendment was postponed, he re-wrote it in its present form (except for
the citizenship clause that was added by the Senate.) When the Joint
Committee rejected it, Bingham came back again. After several close
votes, the Joint Committee eventually endorsed Bingham’s proposed
revised language: “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”
On May 10, 1866, in his final speech to the Congress before the
vote on the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham explained that it would
allow congress to do by congressional enactment what it had never been
able to do. Congress would be able to “protect by national law the
privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the
inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same
shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.”122
The power was needed because many flagrant “violations of the
guarantied privileges of citizens of the United States” had occurred, and
the national government could not provide a remedy. For example,
“[c]ontrary to the express letter of your Constitution, ‘cruel and unusual

119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1292, col. 1.
Id.
Id. at 2542 col.2-3.
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punishments’ have been inflicted under State laws. . . .”123
In 1867, the Fourteenth Amendment had not yet been ratified by the
necessary number of states. Appalled by degrading punishments being
inflicted in some of the former slave states, Representative John Kasson
of Iowa introduced a bill to prevent cruel and unusual punishments. He
said it was the duty of the Congress “to take early action to prevent what
is now both cruel and unusual from becoming simply cruel and usual.”
According to Kasson, his bill applied “to all the States of the Union. It
protects both whites and blacks. . . .”124 Kasson said the bill was “using
the power conferred by the Constitution to protect personal rights in this
country.” He did “not think there can be any reasonable doubt of the
power of Congress to protect personal rights guarantied by the
Constitution.” In support of his proposition he noted that the
“Constitution says that the citizens of one State shall have all the
privileges and immunities of citizens in any other State, and I think
Congress has the right to protect our citizens in the enjoyment of these
rights.”125
Once again, John Bingham pointed out decisions holding the Bill of
Rights limited the powers of Congress, but not the powers of the states.
Bingham favored doing what could be done to prevent cruel and unusual
punishments. He said that when “the pending constitutional amendment
will become part of the supreme law of the land,” Congress would be
empowered “to enforce every one of those limitations so essential to
justice and humanity.” His next response may have been influenced by
the fact that blacks were the main victims of these degrading
punishments. As quoted in the report in the Globe, Bingham referred to
the amendment “by which no State may deny to any person the equal
protection of the laws, including all the limitations for personal
protection of every article and section of the Constitution.”126
In July of 1868, the Secretary of State proclaimed that the necessary
number of states had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. Section one of
the Amendment is Bingham’s great achievement. It embodied his
passionate concern for liberty and equality. From the 1930s to the
1960s, and continuing to this day, the Fourteenth Amendment has
become a major vehicle for protection of both values.
The amendment established basic legal principles. In the 1930s and
later, the Court began applying the principles, translating them into the
123.
124.
125.
126.
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world of the twentieth century. Of course, the later application did not
always follow the way Bingham or his contemporaries thought the
provisions would be applied. Examples include segregation and
application of the equal protection clause in a way that would have
voided laws from the 1860s that restricted the legal rights of married
women.127 The world had radically changed. Even the Constitution
itself had undergone significant changes after 1868, by prohibiting
denial of the right to vote based on race or sex. What appeared rational
to many in 1866 looked arbitrary and unreasonable to most in 1954 or in
the 1970s.
X. RECONSTRUCTION
Passage of the Fourteenth Amendment had not solved the
continuing conflict between liberty and the legacy of slavery. In March
of 1871, the House was considering a bill to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment against Ku Klux Klan violence. The Klan was using
political terrorism against black and white Republicans as part of a plan
by self styled “Redeemers” forcibly to eject Republicans and their black
allies from political power in the Southern states.128 As Bingham saw it,
the issue was the “enforcement of the Constitution on behalf of the
whole people . . . on behalf of every individual citizen of the Republic in
every state and Territory to the extent of the rights guarantied to him by
the Constitution.”129
Critics of the legislation, including some prominent Republicans,
suggested that the change in the constitutional language from Bingham’s
February 26th version130 to the “no state shall” version meant that
congressional enforcement power was now limited to state action.131 By
this theory congressional power could reach state officers who were
depriving citizens of constitutional protections, but not the “private”
Klansmen who were inflicting a reign of terror on Republicans. In this
case, however, Republican state office holders were not the problem.
They were among the victims. The problem was the Klan.
127. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1063, 1064, col. 1-2; Id. at 1089, col. 3; Id. at 1292, col. 3;
Id. at cf., 1294, col. 2.
128. E.g., PAUL ESCOTT, MANY EXCELLENT PEOPLE: POWER AND PRIVILEGE IN NORTH
CAROLINA, 1850-1900, 151-170 (1985); VERNON L. WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 18651890 (1965); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION,: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877,
at 425-59 (1998).
129. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 42(1) App. 81, col.2. (1871).
130. The prototype gave Congress power to enforce privileges and immunities and equal
protection in the rights of life, liberty and property.
131. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 42(1) App.114-116 (Farnsworth), App. 150-54 (Garfield).
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Bingham insisted that the equal protection clause meant that no
state could deny to any person within its jurisdiction “the equal
protection of the Constitution of the United States, as that Constitution is
the supreme law. . . .”132 He insisted that Section one plus the
enforcement clause of Section five provided ample congressional power
to reach both state actors and private conspirators.
In explaining why he changed the form of the amendment,
Bingham said that he had re-read Barron v. Baltimore.
In reexamining the case of Barron, . . . , after my struggle in the House
in February, 1866, I noted and apprehended as I never did before,
certain words in that opinion of Marshall. Referring to the first eight
articles of amendments to the Constitution of the United States, the
Chief Justice said: “Had the framers of these amendments intended
them to be limitations on the powers of the State governments they
would have imitated the framers of the original Constitution, and have
expressed that intention.”133

Acting on that suggestion, Bingham said he imitated the limitations
on the states in Article I, Section 10. He used the “no state shall”
language Marshall had suggested would indicate an intent to apply the
Bill of Rights to the states. Though some thought the privileges or
immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment included all
common law and other rights previously protected solely by the states,
Bingham had a more limited conception. Bingham continued: “the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as
contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the
first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”
Bingham then read, word for word, the first eight amendments.134 By
the force of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham said, “no State,
hereafter can . . . ever repeat the example of Georgia and send men to the
penitentiary, as did that State, for teaching the Indian to read the lessons
of the New Testament. . . .”135
Bingham said the states had denied basic constitutional rights to
United States citizens, and, prior to the Fourteenth Amendment,
American citizens had no remedy. “They denied trial by jury, and he
had no remedy. They took property without compensation, and he had
no remedy. They restricted the freedom of the press, and he had no

132.
133.
134.
135.
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remedy. They restricted freedom of speech, and he had no remedy.
They restricted the rights of conscience, and he had no remedy.”136
How did Bingham respond to the state action argument? Bingham
insisted that Congress had power to legislate for “the better enforcement
of all powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United
States, and for the better protection of the people in the rights thereby
guarantied to them against States and combinations of individuals.”137
According to Bingham, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments “vest in Congress power to protect the right of citizens
against States, and individuals in States, never before granted.”138 He
pointed out that the Constitution differed from the Articles of
Confederation in that it gave Congress power to act directly on
individuals.139
What, he wondered, “would this Government be worth if it must
rely upon states to execute its grants of power, its limitations of power
upon States, and its express guarantees of rights to the people?” States
had concurrent power to protect citizens’ basic rights, but “must we wait
for their action? Are not laws preventive, as well as remedial. . .? Why
not in advance provide against the denial of rights by States, whether the
denial be acts of omission or commission, as well as against the
unlawful acts of combinations and conspiracies against the rights of the
people?”140
Bingham was making three interrelated arguments. First, he
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment required states to obey the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Second, he argued that the basic rights
in the Bill of Rights were now rights of American citizens that Congress
could protect. Third, it could now protect basic rights such as free
speech, not only against state action but against private conspiracies
such as those of the Ku Klux Klan.
The Court soon ruled against him on all counts.141 In a series of
decisions, the Court denied that the Fourteenth Amendment required
states to obey the guarantees of the Bill of Rights and insisted that
congressional enforcement power was limited to state action and did not
136. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 42(1) 85, col.2.
137. Id. at 82, col.3.
138. Id. at 83, col.1.
139. Id. at 85, col.1.
140. Id. at 85, col.2.
141. E.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90
(1876); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (refusing to apply the liberties in the Bill of
Rights to the states); Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883)
(state action requirement).
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reach private action. As to application of the Bill of Rights, the
Bingham position, though not his analysis, has now mostly won the day.
But the Court continues to limit congressional power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment to state action.142
XI. BINGHAM AS A CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTSMAN
Since Bingham’s plan to require states to obey guarantees of the
Bill of Rights failed to be accepted by the Supreme Court for many
years, one natural response is to find Bingham wanting. The draftsman,
not the Court, must be at fault.
Several things are worth noting in Bingham’s defense. First, the
use of the words “privileges” and “immunities” made textual sense as a
collective phrase to describe individual constitutional rights, including
those in the Bill of Rights. In the years from 1830 to 1866 it was quite
common to describe basic rights in the Bill of Rights as privileges or
immunities that belonged to all American citizens.143 A modern
dictionary also suggests that the word privileges would include basic
constitutional rights.144 Leading Republicans often used the words in
that way. A number also interpreted Article IV the way Bingham read
it–as protecting privileges and immunities [constitutional rights]
belonging to citizens of the United States in all the states.145
Second, Bingham did use the “no state shall” formula that Barron
had suggested would have indicated an intent to apply the Bill of Rights
to the states. In that respect, Bingham’s proposal was similar to James
Madison’s unsuccessful amendment to the Constitution designed to
protect free speech, free press and the rights of conscience against the
states. Madison’s proposed amendment passed the House, but failed in
the Senate, so it never made it into the Bill of Rights. Like Madison,
Bingham crafted his prohibition in the words of Article I, section 10’s
limits of the states. Like Madison, he used the words “no state shall.”
One can even cite Madison as using the word “privilege” as Bingham
did. In a 1789 speech in favor of his proposal to require the states to
142. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000).
143. Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note 59, at 1110-32.
144. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 5 (1995) defines abridge as
“reduce. . . lessen, diminish, or curtail. . . .” Id., and “privilege” as “a right, immunity, or benefit
enjoyed by a particular person or a restricted group of persons” or “the rights common of all citizens
under a modern constitutional government.” Id. at 1074.
145. E.g., GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(1) App. 205, col. 2 (1860)(Owen Lovejoy) 38(1) 1202
(1864) (James Wilson); GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(2) 811, col. 1 (1867)(John A. Kasson). See
generally, CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15, at 34-56; Curtis, Historical
Linguistics, supra note 59, at 110-24.
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respect the rights of free press and conscience, Madison described the
rights as “invaluable privileges.”146 Bingham used the same word to
describe constitutional rights listed in the Bill of Rights, including rights
listed by Madison in his unsuccessful effort to place additional
constitutional limits on the states.
Third, as Bryan Wildenthal has shown, in the years after ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment and before the Court rejected application
of the Bill of Rights to the states under the privilege or immunities
clause, application was widely accepted by both Southern Democrats
and Republicans. 147 Finally, the Court might have, but did not, examine
the congressional debates with their strong evidence of intent to apply
the guarantees.148
Bingham might have followed “no state shall . . . abridge” with
“rights in the Bill of Rights” instead of “privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.” From his perspective, the problem, was
that the privileges or immunities were only “chiefly” set out in the Bill
of Rights. There were also others. For a Court committed to the idea
that there were no rights of American citizens in the Bill of Rights (just
limits on federal power), a collective reference to the rights in the Bill of
Rights might also have been treated as an empty set. In retrospect, the
safest course might have been to specify each and every right states were
forbidden to abridge. But that prolix provision is born from the wisdom
of hindsight.
Scholars looking at the incorporation issue have raised technical
legal issues. If the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the First, then,
by one view, it really is a form of gibberish. “No state shall abridge the
guarantee that Congress shall make no law.” Of course, what the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates by reference are the privileges and
immunities of free speech, free press, freedom to assemble and petition,
and free exercise of religion. It does not incorporate the prohibition
against the denial of these rights by Congress. In the First Amendment,
these privileges and immunities are, at the very least, secured against the
146. The amendment passed the House but was defeated by the Senate. Free speech was added
to Madison’s original proposal by the House. Madison argued for his amendment (number 14 on
his list) because the “State Governments are as liable to attack the invaluable privileges as the
General Government is, and therefore ought to be as cautiously guarded against.” 2 THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1032, 1113, 1122 (Bernard Schwartz, ed. 1971).
147. Brian Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court
and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO. ST.
L.J. 1051 (2000).
148. This statement is intensely controversial and scholars continue to wrangle over the
significance of the congressional debates.
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action of Congress. In the Fourteenth Amendment, a new security is
thrown around these rights–the guarantee that “no state shall” abridge
them.
A second technical legal argument relates to the freedom of speech
and press as understood in 1791, when the states ratified the First
Amendment. If the First Amendment meant merely to protect against
prior restraint, the argument asserts, then the phrase incorporated by
reference in the Fourteenth Amendment could mean no more. “Water
can rise no higher than its source.” It is highly dubious that the
Blackstone “no prior restraint” vision of freedom of the press was the
vision of 1791.149
But even if it were, it does not follow that the words should have
the meaning attributed to them in 1791. First, assume that the
Fourteenth Amendment had explicitly provided that no state shall
abridge freedom of speech or press. Would we insist that the words
must be given their 1791 meaning even though it is quite clear that was
not how they were understood in 1868? Not if we followed the idea that
constitutional provisions reflect at the least the decisions of “we the
people” at the time of their enactment. Not if we looked at the
“original” 1868 meaning of words for guidance. By 1868, the idea that
free press was merely a protection against prior restraint had virtually
disappeared from general discussion.
Instead of writing out a long list of all privileges and immunities
explicit or implicit in all the constitutional guarantees, John Bingham
used the device of incorporation by reference. In theory, constitutional
provisions come from “we the people” and judges often say they are to
be interpreted to effectuate the popular will. If we follow ideas of
popular sovereignty, then the words would mean at least what they
meant to people in 1868, not what they meant to some judges in 1798 or
even to “the people” in 1791. The other approach says, “well of course
we know what you meant to say, but it doesn’t count because you failed
to use exactly the right words.” Meaning is a search for purpose and
purpose should be understood contextually. The “we know what you
meant but you didn’t use just the right words so what you said does not
work” approach exalts form over substance. It constrains constitutional
interpretation by a series of arbitrary rules unrelated to the purposes the
amendment sought to advance.
Those who proposed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
149. See, e.g., CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at chapters 1, 2, and 3 and authorities
cited.
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understood freedom of speech and press to include freedom from prior
restraint and freedom from subsequent punishment. That is what should
count. (The evidence for that hypothesis is much stronger than the
evidence for the contrary hypothesis.) The attacks on free speech, free
press, and freedom of religious expression the Republicans had been
complaining about were subsequent punishments (and private violence),
not prior restraints.
Bingham’s claim of power to reach private conspiracies looks weak
today, though it was aimed only at conspiracies designed to punish the
exercise of constitutional rights. In good part, that is so because
Bingham’s theory contradicts long established Supreme Court doctrine
forged after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bingham
believed that the rights in the Bill of Rights belonged to American
citizens, an understanding he thought had been recognized by the
references to the rights in the national Constitution. He saw that Barron
stood in the way of that vision because it held the Bill of Rights did not
limit the states. But with Barron eliminated and the Fourteenth
Amendment ratified, Bingham thought the rights were established. By
this view the negative “no state shall . . . abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States” language implicitly
recognized that Americans had such privileges and protected the
underlying rights of American citizens set out in the Bill of Rights.
As Bingham and many understood it, the Fourteenth Amendment
proclaimed constitutional rights including those privileges and
immunities in the Bill of Rights to be rights of citizens of the United
States. Since Congress had the power to enforce the amendment under
Section five, it could legislate to protect citizens against private attacks
designed to deny Americans their rights.
Federalism concerns shared by Bingham and others would still
have required some implicit limits on federal power. Congress could
only reach actions motivated by the specific intent to deprive citizens of
constitutional rights. The states would retain concurrent power to punish
the violations, unless the state remedy contradicted the federal one.
Implying a right from limitations on state power was hardly
unprecedented. Nor was the next step, concluding that the Constitution
mandated or at least authorized protection of the right, even against
private persons. That seems to be the lesson from two Supreme Court
cases, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Ableman v. Booth. Both decisions
read the Constitution very broadly to protect rights of slave owners.150
150. See CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15, at 81, 106, 159-61, and 235 n. 49
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In Prigg v. Pennsylvania,151 the Court held that slave owners had a
constitutional right to seize “slaves” in free states and take them back to
a slave state without any judicial process at all.152 The right was treated
as implicit in the essentially negative language of the Fugitive Slave
Clause. “No [slave] held to service or labor in one State under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such [slavery] but shall be
delivered up on the Claim of the [slave owner].” In free states all people
were presumed to be free. The Court’s decision implied, from the
prohibition on state laws in the fugitive slave clause, a slaveholder’s
right to recapture his “slave” without any judicial process. For
Americans of African descent, the Prigg decision had potentially heavy
costs. The slaveholder’s right of recapture found in Prigg stripped
blacks in the North of protection implicit in the presumption of
freedom.153
The Court’s reading of the power provided by the Fugitive Slave
Clause went further. In Ableman v. Booth,154 the Court suggested that
the fugitive slave law of 1850–a law that punished private persons for
assisting escaping slaves–was constitutional in all respects.155 Both
(discussing Prigg and state action problems).
151. 41 U.S. 539 (1842). Prigg v. Pennsylvania held that slave owners had a constitutional
right to seize “slaves” in free states and take them back to a slave state without any judicial process
at all. Id. at 613. This was so even though in free states all people were presumed free; in slave
states mere color gave rise to a presumption of slavery. Id. at 576 In effect, the Court’s decision,
stripped blacks of the presumption of freedom.
As the Court saw it, any delay in the right of the alleged slave owner, including the delay
required for a due process hearing, was intolerable. Id. at 612-613. So slave owners could capture
and remove “slaves” with no process at all. But what if the black person being dragged away was
not a slave? Pennsylvania had argued that whether the person was a slave was the very issue that
needed to be decided. Id. at 576-77. A rule allowing private parties to seize “slaves” without a
judicial hearing to determine status threatened free blacks. Id. It was an unreasonable seizure in
violation of the Fourth amendment. Id. A government-authorized removal without a hearing
deprived the “person” who was seized of liberty without due process. Id. Pennsylvania also argued
that the language of the Fugitive Slave Clause which required that true slaves be “delivered up” on
the “claim” of the slaveholder presupposed a judicial determination of status. Id. at 574-575.
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1858) said the fugitive slave law of 1850 which punished private
interference with the right was constitutional in all respects.
152. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 613.
153. Id. at 576. For a complimentary perspective, see, e.g., Rebecca Zeitlow, Belonging,
Protection and Equality: The Neglected Citizenship Clause and the Meaning of Equality, 62 U.
PITT. L. REV. 281, 326 (2000); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 26, 70 (2000).
154. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1858).
155. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, sec. 7 (1850). “[T]he act of Congress
commonly called the fugitive slave law is, in all of its provisions, fully authorized by the
Constitution of the United States.” Ableman, 62 U.S. at 526 (1858).
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Prigg and Ableman established that Congress had the power to protect
rights inferred from restrictive constitutional provisions. Indeed, during
the debate on the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, James Wilson, Chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee, cited Prigg as authority for Congress’
power to pass the bill based on the due process clause. If a
constitutional right implied a remedy for slave owners, he said, certainly
the law must do at least as much for the newly freed slaves.156 If the bar
on state legislation in the Fugitive Slave Clause implied a right for slave
owners—a right Congress could enforce against private persons—why
should the Fourteenth Amendment not be read to imply rights such as
free speech that Congress could protect against private persons?
Again and again in 1866, Republicans had insisted that allegiance
and protection are reciprocal. To many it seemed clear that the nation
must have the power to protect basic rights of its citizens from whom it
could demand the ultimate sacrifice. In the years before the Civil War
many opponents of slavery had been victims of mob violence, violence
that was denounced again and again as a violation of the basic privilege
of free speech secured to all citizens by the national Constitution.157 In
1866, Republicans insisted on the need for protection of the rights of
citizens. Some cited the New Orleans and Memphis riots against blacks
and Republicans to show the need for the amendment.158
Many insisted on a new far more protective concept of American
citizenship. “If the cry ‘I am a Roman citizen’ protected the Roman in
his mongrel republic,” asked Senator Nye in a speech in California after
the thirty-ninth Congress had adjourned, “with what redoubled force
does the cry that I am an American citizen protect me.”159 Congressman
Woodbridge of Vermont made a similar claim. The Fourteenth
Amendment was designed “to cement the Union, [so] that any of us can
go into any State in the Union with the declaration ‘I am an American
citizen’ with the same consciousness of protection as of old it was
sufficient for any citizen of the Roman empire to say ‘I am a Roman
citizen’.”160 Congressman James Wilson defended the amendment as
necessary to protect free speech. Northern boys “must have the same
liberty of speech in any part of the South as they always have had in the
North. . . . [N]o more cross road committees to wait upon liberty loving
men. . .”–a reference to mob violence often inflicted on opponents of
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1294.
See, e.g., CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at 229-39, 281-88.
CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15, at 159.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 143.
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slavery.161
Still, much of the discussion in 1866 explicitly referred to the need
to protect against state action and state inaction.162 The first version of
the Bingham amendment, the one that gave Congress power to secure to
all persons, equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property,
had been criticized because it seemed to some to allow Congress to
legislate directly on all subjects and to preempt all state laws.163
Before the Court rejected congressional power to reach private
attacks on Bill of Rights liberties, a federal circuit decision held rights in
the Bill of Rights were rights that Congress could protect against private
conspiracies. Since the Bill of Rights limited both the federal
government and the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, the rights
were secured to the citizen and could be protected by the federal
government against private attacks. Though issued by a circuit judge,
much of the decision had in fact been written by Supreme Court Justice
Joseph P. Bradley. So it represented the view of not just one judge, but
of two.164
In the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham finally
persuaded the Congress to accept his proposal. Bingham was less
successful in his effort to change the proposed language of what became
the Fifteenth Amendment.
XII. JOHN BINGHAM AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE
In January of 1869, Congress was considering a constitutional
amendment dealing with the right to vote. The amendment, as finally
ratified, provided that the right of United States citizens to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude. John Bingham advocated
a different approach. Basically, his proposal prohibited states from
abridging or denying the franchise to male citizens of the United States
who were over twenty-one years of age and of sound mind. Bingham
161. Id. at 145.
162. See, e.g., id. at 53-54, 62.
163. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1063-65 (Rep. Hale); 1082 (Sen. Stewart); 1083, 1087
(Rep. Davis). GLOBE, supra note 32, at 42(1) at App. 151 (Garfield) (1871); Hale, a Republican,
had opposed the prototype of the Fourteenth Amendment; but in 1875, he insisted that the final
version of the amendment was not limited to state action and could reach private conduct. GLOBE,
supra note 32, at 43(2) 479-480 (1875). Garfield voted for the final bill which did reach certain
private action. See GLOBE, supra note 32, at 42(1) 808.
164. United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81-82 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871 (No. 15,282). The
Court’s reasoning was suggested by Justice Bradley in response to a letter of inquiry by Judge
Woods. CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15, at 172.
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left the states with only a few additional powers to regulate suffrage.
They were allowed to establish a residency requirement of not more than
one year, and states could disfranchise those who had been convicted of
treason or other infamous crimes as well as those who engaged in
rebellion in the future.165
Bingham objected to allowing
disfranchisement of all who had served in the Confederate army.
Recognizing that the much broader protection might not succeed,
on February 20, 1869, Bingham later sought to add additional limitations
to the proposal to forbid discrimination based on race, color, or previous
condition of servitude. As a fall back position, Bingham proposed that
“the right to vote and hold office shall not be denied or abridged by
States on account of race, color, nativity, property, creed, or previous
condition of servitude.” Still he indicated that he preferred something
like his earlier broader protection.166 Bingham did not succeed with
either proposal.
Bingham’s preferred version of the amendment would have
protected the right to vote more broadly than the Fifteenth Amendment
as it was enacted. It would have done so because it would have
prevented any restrictions beyond those allowed. The poll tax, literacy
tests, tests of the ability to read and understand the state constitution and
similar methods used in the 1890s in early 1900s to disfranchise blacks
and some poor whites would have been more obviously unconstitutional.
Whether any constitutional provision would have protected the
right to vote against a faction determined to eject their opponents from
power “peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must”167 is doubtful—unless
of course the people of the nation regained and maintained the will to
protect the right to vote.
XIII. CONCLUSION
I began this essay with a reflection on our national story, the stories
we tell, the stories we ignore, and the stories we have repressed. For
nations as well as individuals, recognizing and accepting the darker side
of our experience is important for transformation.
American history reveals a gap between ideals and practice. We
have had slavery, the denial of the vote to those men without sufficient
property, gender discrimination and the denial of the vote to women,
165. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 40(3) 638, 728 (1869).
166. Id. at 1426, 1427, col.1.
167. VERNON L. WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 1865-1890, 187 and generally chapter
13 (1947, 1965).
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political terrorism, mistreatment of workers, and a racial caste system.
The large darker side of our national experience is illuminated by the
efforts of John Bingham.
Stephen A. Douglas and Chief Justice Roger Taney both confronted
the tension between the Declaration of Independence and slavery. Both
Taney and Douglas interpreted the words of the Declaration in light of
the slaveholding practice of some of the signers and Founders and in
light of the clauses of the Constitution that recognized slavery.168 They
insisted that the Declaration’s signers were not hypocrites. Since
Jefferson and other signers held and continued to hold slaves, when they
wrote all people are created equal they could not have meant the
declaration to be read literally. According to Taney and Douglas, what
they actually meant was that all white men are created equal.169
In contrast to Douglas and Taney, another common approach to the
gap between ideals and practice is simply to reject the framers as
hypocrites. The same approach can be applied to more recent framers—
such as those of the Fourteenth Amendment. Like all human beings,
many also failed to live up fully to their ideals—for example on issues
like womens’ rights and integration. They also have “failed to keep up
with the times as a result of being dead.”
Another approach is to recognize the radical idealism of the
American Revolution, the Declaration, and of the later Fourteenth
Amendment, and to acknowledge that its authors naturally fell short of
fully realizing their ideals. Lincoln read the Declaration as setting out
the basic purposes of the nation, as a charter of freedom. But he
admitted that its authors had not instituted the equality they espoused for
blacks. Indeed, he pointed out that they had not even established it for
all white men. The Declaration was a statement of national ideals. Like
all statements of ideals, it represented a goal to be pursued. It was a
statement of ethical aspirations rather than a description of current
168. CREATED EQUAL: THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, 62-63 (Paul M.
Angle, ed. 1958) (Douglas on the Declaration). Taney in Dred Scott makes the same claim:
The general words above quoted [“all men are created equal”] would seem to embrace
the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would
be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not
intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this
declaration; for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the
conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would
have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted; and
instead of the sympathy of mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would
have deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 410.
169. Id.
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practice. Here is Lincoln’s numinous explication:
I think the authors of that notable instrument [the Declaration of
Independence] intended to include all men, but they did not intend to
declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say all
were equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, or social
capacity. They defined with tolerable exactness, in what respects they
did consider all men created equal—equal in “certain inalienable
rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”
This they said, and this they meant. They did not mean to assert the
obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that equality, nor
yet, that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact
they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to
declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as
circumstances should permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim
for free society, which should be familiar to all, and revered by all;
constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never
perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly
spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness
and value of life to all people of all colors every where. The assertion
“that all men are created equal” was of no practical use in effecting our
separation from Great Britain; and it was placed in the Declaration, not
for that, but for future use. Its authors meant it to be, thank God, it is
now proving itself, a stumbling block to those who in after times might
seek to turn a free people back into the hateful paths of despotism.
They knew the proneness of prosperity to breed tyrants, and they
meant when such should re-appear in this fair land and commence their
vocation they should find for them at least one hard nut to crack.170

John Bingham made similar contributions. Bingham was a student
of the history of liberty and of the United States Constitution. As a
result, he could and did situate his efforts in the larger story of AngloAmerican liberty. Because he was a student of the Constitution,
Bingham recognized, as many of his colleagues initially did not, why a
constitutional amendment was needed to secure for American citizens
Bill of Rights liberties against the states. He also saw how the
amendment would greatly reinforce the claim of constitutional power to
pass the Civil Rights Bill, a recognition that distinguished him from
many of his colleagues. Bingham cherished the vision of the
Constitution that secured basic rights equally to all citizens regardless of
wealth, race, sex, nationality, or religion. Though at first, in common
170. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES, LETTERS, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS, THE LINCOLN
DOUGLAS DEBATES (1832-1858) 398-99 (Library of America ed. 1989).
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with others at that time, he did not see the right to vote as fundamental,
his later statements show that he, like the nation, was moving in that
direction. Still, as Bingham understood it, the basic protections of the
due process clause extended to all—citizens and foreigners; to people of
all colors, black, yellow, or white; and to women as well as men. He
failed to understand the full implications of his constitutional ideals of
equal protection for gender discrimination—but so did many others at
the time.171
In the apparently endless debates about the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, scholars argue about whether the amendment
was intended as a limited guarantee of equality under state law or as a
protection of national rights of American citizens set out in the
Constitution. (Of course, the arguments are not mutually exclusive.)
For Bingham the ideas of equality and basic national rights of American
citizens throughout the republic were mutually reinforcing. As he saw
it, the Due Process Clause, which extended its protections to all persons,
both protected basic rights and, because it did so for all, it secured
equality. Similarly, provisions granting basic rights to all citizens,
secured substantial equality.
Bingham read the Constitution and the Bill of Rights as statements
of legal ideals.
He recognized many of the shortcomings of
contemporary practice. And Bingham, as much as anyone, worked to
bring those ideals closer to reality. Though sometimes subjected to
judicial abuse, the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection and due
process clauses have been important protections for the liberties of
American citizens. The Court has recently breathed new life into the
privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,172 though
it remains to be seen whether it will eventually read it as Bingham, many
of his colleagues, and many of their contemporaries did–to protect basic
constitutional rights of all citizens.
The abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison rejected the Constitution
as an agreement with hell and a covenant with death and publicly burned
it.173 But Bingham saw its ideals and its promises. He also saw clearly
how the ideals had been compromised as a result of slavery. But
because he appreciated and cherished the ideals, Bingham was well
positioned for the work of extending them.
In one way, it is easy to understand why the story of John Bingham
171. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) at 1063, 1089 (discussing the rights of married women).
172. Sanez v. Roe, 536 U.S. 489 (1999).
173. E.g., HENRY MAYER, ALL ON FIRE: WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE ABOLITION OF
SLAVERY 313, 445 (1998).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003

49

Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 2
NEWCURTIS.DOC

666

7/28/03 11:48 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:617

was ignored for so long. Again and again and again, Bingham’s story
intersects with what had been omitted parts of our national narrative and
illuminates the dark recesses of the national shadow—suppressions of
free speech and civil liberty in the interests of slavery; rejection of the
ideals of the Declaration by people who became leaders of the
Confederacy and the new South; denials of basic rights to African
Americans by the Southern state governments Andrew Johnson installed
right after the Civil War; use of political terrorism against blacks and
Republicans during Reconstruction; the Supreme Court’s rejection of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s basic protection of constitutional rights of all
Americans in every state; the destruction of Reconstruction statutes, and
denials of the right to vote to blacks; and the perversions of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees to protect corporate empires from
democratic regulation.
I know very little about how John Bingham felt when he saw the
wreck the United States Supreme Court was making of his handiwork.
How did he react when the Court rejected application of the liberties in
the Bill of Rights to the states and treated the privileges or immunities
clause as mostly meaningless? These decisions were reached, at least in
part, in the interest of preserving the rights of the states. What did he
think when the Court pulled the teeth out of Reconstruction statutes
designed to enforce constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities of
American citizens against state or private attack? These had been written
to protect the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens of the United
States. When the Court found that there were very few of these and that
they did not include any rights in the Bill of Rights,174 the statutes lost
much of their effect. What did he think about the conversion of the
Fourteenth Amendment from a protection for all constitutional rights for
all citizens to a bulwark of corporate power against the protests of
farmers and workers? Here we have a bit more information. Bingham
later wrote that the amendment had been designed to protect natural
persons, not corporations.175 That seems quite reasonable, particularly
since the first sentence of Section one refers to persons “born or
naturalized in the United States.”
In one way, the neglect of Bingham’s story is understandable. It
does not fit well with the story often told, or with the story of the
174. E.g., United States v. Cruikshank; 92 U.S. 542 (1876). The Court’s subsequent revival of
the incorporation doctrine also revived some of these remaining statutes. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
175. Erving Beauregard, “John A. Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment,” 40 THE
HISTORIAN 67, 69 (1987). Unfortunately the correspondence cited appears to have been lost. Id.
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Supreme Court as the consistent guardian of our liberties.
In another way, the neglect is quite hard to understand. After all,
Bingham’s story is a central part of the story of American liberty: the
struggle against slavery and its legacy; the struggle for equality; and for
free speech and press and other basic constitutional rights.
We continue to struggle to understand the meaning of our American
experience. The current controversy over how to understand the Lost
Cause and the Lost (Privileges or Immunities) Clause176 of the
Fourteenth Amendment shows the presence of the past. Not too long
ago, Gale Norton, now President Bush’s Secretary of the Interior, spoke
about the meaning of the Civil War and events that followed it. She
noted that with the defeat of the Confederacy “we lost too much. We
lost the idea that states were to stand against the federal government
gaining too much power over our lives.” John Ashcroft, now Attorney
General, expressed similar sentiments. He said “traditionalists must do
more” to defend the Southern heritage. “I’ve got to do more.”177
Recently, in United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court
reiterated the state action requirement and expressed its approval of
decisions that destroyed the effort, based on the Fourteenth Amendment,
to enforce Reconstruction statutes against private suppression of the
exercise of rights protected by the Bill of Rights. Like its predecessors
during and after Reconstruction, the Court in 2000 was motivated in
good part by a legitimate concern for federalism. And in fairness to the
Court, the historical record on the state action subject is puzzling and
contradictory. The Court’s approach to the state action problem has
some support in text and history, though it over looked evidence
supporting a contrary interpretation. Many in 1866, including John
Bingham,178 described the amendment as prohibiting denial of basic
rights by states. But the Court reaffirmed its prior decisions in sweeping
terms. In United States v. Morrison, the Court repeated once again
[T]he time-honored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its
very terms, prohibits only state action. “[T]he principle has become
firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as
may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no
176. The reference to the “lost clause” comes from Akhil Amar. Akhil Reed Amar, Lost
Clause, NEW REPUBLIC, June 14, 1999, at 15.
177. Quoted in James M. McPherson, Southern Comfort, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, April
12, 2001 at 28.
178. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1088-89, 2542 (Bingham on the amendment as giving
Congress power to prohibit unconstitutional state actions).
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shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful.”179

The Court said that Congress had exceeded its Section five power
in the Reconstruction statutes because such laws were “‘directed
exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to the
laws of the State, or their administration by her officers.”180 Morrison’s
reasoning may suggest that, indeed, Congress had no power to protect
Republicans in the South from private attacks designed to punish them
for their decision to associate with the Republican party and espouse its
doctrines. It further suggests that such a sweeping dictum was essential
to preserve the role of the states. The actual issue, however, was much
narrower. Did the Fourteenth Amendment allow Congress to pass
statutes such as the anti-KKK acts? These laws were limited to
punishing private action taken for the purpose of denying basic liberties,
including those in the Bill of Rights. The laws also reached private
action denying equal protection of the laws. The conspiracies were
designed to punish American citizens because of their political
expression, beliefs, and affiliation. The Court could have upheld such
laws while still rejecting an essentially unlimited power under Section
five to preempt any and all state laws.
Some prior Court decisions make Morrison somewhat less
troublesome.
The Court had broadly interpreted the Thirteenth
Amendment and has held it has no state action requirement.181 As a
result, the federal government could today protect blacks from private
race-based attacks. Under Morrison and prior cases, a claim to federal
protection for Socialists, Republicans, Catholics, Unitarians, or
Democrats subjected to private attack because of their beliefs would
have little chance of success.
The vision of Republicans passing legislation to combat the Ku
Klux Klan was broader. In 1871 discussing a bill to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, Senator Edmunds explained that the bill did
not reach things like a private conspiracy growing out a neighborhood
feud. “[B]ut if . . . it should appear that this conspiracy was formed
against this man because he was a Democrat, . . . , or because he was a
Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a
Vermonter . . . this section could reach it.”182 Much of the violence
179. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621.
180. Id. at 621.
181. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Compare, Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
182. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 42(1) 567, col. 2-3 (1871).
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against blacks was based on their decision to support first the
Republican and later the Populist party.
In Morrison, the Court also paid homage to the judges who had
excised Bill of Rights liberties from the Fourteenth Amendment and
destroyed much of the congressional effort to protect white and black
Republicans in the South.
The force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these [state action]
decisions stems not only from the length of time they have been on the
books, but also from the insight attributable to the Members of the
Court at that time. Every Member had been appointed by President
Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, or Arthur—and each of their judicial
appointees obviously had intimate knowledge and familiarity with the
events surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.183

John Bingham also appreciated the virtues of a federal system and
the role of the states. But, understandably, he was more fully aware of
the abuses of civil liberty states and mobs had practiced in the years
before the Civil War. So there is considerable tension between the
Bingham story and the Court’s traditional understanding of Fourteenth
Amendment history. There is even more tension between Bingham’s
story and the “Southern heritage” story of a Civil War over states’ rights.
Constitutional declarations of rights depend to an important extent
on popular adherence to the ideals they declare. That is at least one
reason why forgetting the story of John Bingham and his colleagues has
been such a loss. A more complete account of our national story would
help us better to understand our national values and the struggles to
preserve them. The values of the judges who interpret them also matter.
Bingham’s story and his setbacks remind us that the struggle for
liberty is never finally won. But there is a second moral to Bingham’s
story, to the story of the Second Reconstruction’s realization of many of
the ideals of the first, and to the story of how most guarantees of the Bill
of Rights were eventually applied to the states as Bingham planned.
Though the battle for liberty is never finally won, the battle is also never
finally lost.

183. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621.
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